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ABSTRACT 
Pursuant to P.A. 83-1268, this study investigates some of the 
issues involved in modifying the hazardous waste fee (tax) 
structure for Illinois. One of these includes the possibility of 
basing fees on the "degree-of-hazard" associated with a wast.~ 
stream. This study focuses on the major factors that policymakers 
should take into account in considering a hazardous waste tax. 
The most important of these -- the effect on controlling land 
disposal practices at a more socially acceptable level is 
examined in detail. It is felt here that t~e major purpose of a 
tax on hazardous wastes should be to increase economic incentives 
for generators to manage their wastes in a way that minimizes risk 
to society. A review of hazardous waste taxes in other states, 
however, shows that generally they are structured to generate 
funds for state government activities, rather than to explicitly 
encourage safer management practices. 
A literature review of pollution taxes suggests that an 
incentive-based tax on hazardous wastes is potentially a 
cost-effective pOlicy strategy. While the study cautions 
policymakers against adopting an "optimal" hazardous waste tax 
for Illinois, in view of existing regulations and the legal 
incidence of liability burdens, it lays the 'groundwork for a more 
detailed investigation of issues in designing and administering a 
modified (incentive-based) tax for Illinois. This tax, relative 
to the existing hazardous waste fees in Illinois, would more 
explicitly discourage land disposal of hazardous wastes, 
particularly those that are jUdged to have a high 
"degree-of-hazard." The report points out that a tax should 
account for damages from specific waste streams. These damages 
are contingent upon the "degree-of-hazard," the type of disposal, 
and disposal site location. 
A modified tax can speed up the industry shift away from land 
disposal to safer waste management practices. A modified tax can 
also provide additional funds for cleanup of land disposal sites. 
Because of the existing stringent federal and state regulations 
and liability laws, however, a modified tax may have little 
environmental effect while imposing additional cost to Illinois 
industry. A modified tax may at best be an appropriate interim 
policy until 1987, at which time land disposal practices will be 
prohibited in Illinois. 
ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
Scientific evidence attests to the potential environmental 
threats from unsafe hazardous waste management. In response to 
research results, the federal government and the state of Illinois 
have enacted stringent regulations to control land disposal of 
hazardous wastes. The 1984 amendments to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reflect the intent of the 
U.s. Congress to reduce land disposal of hazardous wastes, and in 
some cases, to prohibit land disposal of certain types of wastes 
that pose the greatest threat to society. Illinois' environmental 
laws prohibit land disposal of hazardous wastes starting in 1987, 
unless industry can demonstrate that alternative management 
practices are not "economically reasonable or technically 
feasible" (P.A. 82-572). Disposing of liquid hazardous wastes in 
landfills in Illinois is now prohibited unless a variance is 
obtained from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA). 
In spite of these seemingly harsh regulations, federal and 
state governments are concerned about the regulations' 
effectiveness in reducing environmental risks from improper 
hazardous waste disposal. Some states, for example, have adopted 
waste-end taxes (taxes imposed on waste generation or disposal) to 
support RCRA and state requirements aimed at reducing 
land-disposal of hazardous wastes. Federal waste-end taxes are 
now being proposed to provide a funding source for the Superfund 
cleanup program and to encourage industry to reduce the amount of 
wastes discarded in land disposal sites. 
P.A. 83-1268 required an evaluation of the benefits of 
assessing hazard waste fees based on "degree-af-hazard." This 
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report focuses on this and other issues involved in designing a 
waste-end tax for Illinois. It provides support for a tax on 
generators that explicitly encourages management practices that 
are less damaging to the environment than land disposal. A 
literature review of pollution taxes strongly suggests that a 
waste-end tax has the potential to be an effective cost-saving 
policy strategy. This report, however, cautions that a modified 
waste-end tax complementing the existing federal and state 
regulations may not be supportable, particularly in view of 
Illinois' land-disposal prohibition starting in 1987. In 
addition, current considerations of liability provide a strong 
disincentive to landfi11ing. At best, a modified waste-end tax 
may buttress the existing state hazardous waste regulations until 
the prohibition requirement becomes effective in 1987. 
Table 1 lists the strengths and weaknesses of four policy 
strategies that are discussed in this report. It is assumed that 
the major objective of each strategy is to reduce land disposal of 
hazardous wastes. The four strategies are: 
o Direct Controls 
o Waste-End Tax (Optimal Tax) 
o Combination Control-Tax Policy ("Second Best" Tax) 
o Modified Tax 
The optimal tax strategy involves setting a tax that 
corresponds to the environmental risks associated with land 
disposal. An optimal tax requires no prescriptive regulations 
(e.g., RCRA) to complement it. From both an economic efficiency 
and equity perspective, an optimal tax, theoretically, is the most 
attractive. The absence of reliable information on the risks to 
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society from land disposal, however, makes the optimal-tax option 
unworkable. An optimal tax may also be "too risky" because of the 
uncertainty about the polluters' response to the tax. For 
example, if disposal costs are only a small proportion of a 
company's total costs, the company may choose to continue land 
disposing. Direct controls, a second option, have been found to 
-
be highly cost-inefficient in controlling pollutants. Direct 
controls have their greatest strength in regulating land disposal 
practices at a predetermined (politically acceptable) level. 
The combination control-tax pOlicy is probably the most 
attractive when compared with other policies in terms of holding 
down compliance costs for industry, of reducing the risks of "too 
much" land disposal, and of administrative feasibility. A 
waste-end tax combined with the existing RCRA and Illinois 
hazardous waste regulations may appear as a combination 
control-tax policy. But it is not. A combination policy would 
attempt to set a tax that is expected to control land disposal at 
some predetermined level. The generator sUbject to this policy 
would not be required to reduce land disposal of its wastes. 
Neither would the owner of a disposal site be required to adopt 
designated land disposal technologies. In contrast, existing 
regulations are prescriptive -- e.g., RCRA prohibits the land 
disposal of some types of wastes. 
It seems reasonable to ask: Why should a waste-end tax be 
restructured in Illinois when state regulations prohibit land 
disposal starting in 1987. One response is that a modified 
waste-end tax implemented before 1987 may speed up the response of 
industry in modifying its waste-management practices by 
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land-disposing fewer wastes or by reducing waste generation. A 
waste-end tax may also encourage industry to recycle or recover 
its wastes, rather than to adopt other technologies that are less 
desirable (but more desirable than land disposal). Finally, a 
restructured waste-end tax, in addition to the existing hazardous 
waste disposal fee in Illinois, may be desirable as a source of 
funding for the cleanup of land disposal sites. In summary, an 
additional waste-end tax can be supported, notwithstanding 
stringent federal and state regulations. Such a tax may be 
justifiable as an appropriate interim strategy prior to the 1987 
land-disposal ban in Illinois. 
The report offers several recommendations and conclusions. 
The most important are presented below. 
1.	 A waste-end tax, by and in itself, when properly structured, 
is an effective policy tool to discourage land disposal of 
hazardous wastes. Much theoretical support and empirical 
evidence exist for adopting a taxing pOlicy meant both to 
control a certain pollutant and to minimize both regulatory 
costs and industry expenses. The economic benefits of a tax 
are especially great when compared with direct control 
strategies that dictate to industries how they should reduce 
their pollutants (e.g., technology-based standards). 
2.	 The effectiveness of a modified waste-end tax in Illinois is 
greatly reduced by the stringent requirements embodied in 
RCRA and its 1984 amendments, and in the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Act. Even if a properly designed 
tax can be implemented -- one that correctly accounts for the 
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"degree-of-hazard" of the waste and varying environmental 
risks resulting from different waste management practices 
its effect on the amount of land-disposed waste may be 
minimal. This is because existing federal and state 
regulations, as well as market incentives and liability, may 
already be providing industry with adequate incentives to 
-
control land disposal of hazardous wastes. The land-di~posal 
prohibition and the technology-based provisions in existing 
federal and state regulations are especially important in 
diminishing the effectiveness of a waste-end tax. There is 
some empirical evidence suggesting that federal and state 
regulations have already induced Illinois industry to shift 
from land disposal technologies to safer waste management 
practices. A waste-end tax, however, can be structured to 
encourage "preferred" waste management practices, such as 
waste recycling and recovery. 
3.	 A restructured waste-end tax in Illinois may best function as 
an interim strategy speeding up industry's response to the 
land-disposal ban in Illinois beginning in 1987. Put simply, 
a high enough tax may cause industry to shift from 
land-disposal practices to safer practices in a shorter 
period of time. Industry may also respond to a tax by 
reducing waste generation. But if such a tax is deemed 
desirable, it would need to be implemented as quickly as 
possible. 
4.	 A waste-end tax should be imposed on the generator. This is 
because generatqrs are ultimately responsible under existing 
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regulations for the safe disposal of hazardous wastes and 
generators decide which waste management technologies are 
employed. A generator tax is most attractive in providing 
direct and poweful economic incentives for controlling unsafe 
land disposal practices. One disadvantage of a generator tax 
when compared to a disposal facility tax is that 
administrative costs would likely be higher because there are 
far fewer disposal facilities than generators. 
5.	 The effectiveness of a waste-end tax is greatly influenced by 
the ability to impose different tax rates based on the 
varying "degree-of-damage" associated with waste streams. A 
well designed tax should account for the variations in 
environmental risks ("degree-of-damage") among land disposal 
sites. A theoretical foundation clearly exists for setting a 
"damage" tax on hazardous wastes. The potential benefits of 
a tax are only realized when tax rates account for variations 
not only in "degree-of-hazard" of the waste stream but also 
in damages among disposal sites and methods. These risks are 
dependent upon such factors as the location of the disposal 
facility, the toxicity and physiochemical properties of the 
disposed wastes ("degree-of-hazard"), and the type of 
disposal technology. Since techniques for measuring such 
factors' impacts on risks, however, are in most cases either 
extremely imprecise or absent, a tax incorporating 
"degree-of-damage" of a waste stream is unworkable at this 
time. 
6.	 Whether a modified waste-end tax would hamper economic growth 
in Illinois depends. to a large extent. on the 
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competitiveness of industries generating hazardous wastes. A 
tax is expected to increase the overall costs, including tax 
liabilities of waste-generating firms. If these firms sell 
products in highly competitive markets, their profit margins 
are more likely to decline. The reason is that firms will be 
less capable of passing on to their customers the higher 
costs resulting from a tax. The extent to which a tax would 
cause Illinois firms to reduce their production or, in the 
long-term, to relocate in another state, requires further 
analysis. 
7.	 Other market-based policies, such as marketable permits and a 
deposit-refund system, may be more effective than a waste-end 
tax to reduce the amount of land-disposed wastes in Illinois. 
Marketable permits are considered by many analysts as more 
attractive than a tax. In recent years, the u. s. 
Environmental Protection Agncy (u.s. EPA) and some state 
regulatory agencies have promoted the marketable-permits 
strategy as an alternative to traditional "command and 
control" regulation. A deposit-refund system is appealing 
because it deters illegal dumping and reduces administrative 
costs. Experience with this type of mechanism (e.g., 
Oregon's "Bottle Bill" approach; German waste oil program) 
has shown it to be a cost-effective strategy for improving 
environmental quality. 
8.	 A survey of waste-end taxes in other states points to the 
failure of these taxes to encourage safer management of 
hazardous wastes. Most state taxes are not structured to 
provide industry with strong incentives to adopt safer waste 
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management technologies. This view is consistent with the 
conclusions reached in a recent u.s. EPA study. The- main 
objective of most state taxes is to provide the state's share 
of clean-up costs for land disposal sites either placed on 
the u.s. EPA's National Priorities list or designated by the 
state. Although some states reported a shifting away from 
land disposal after a tax was imposed, no statistical 
evidence exists showing that the tax was a major factor. 
Although providing incentives was a consideration in the 
assessment of the current fees in Illinois, the fees are 
probably not high enough to be effective in that role. 
9.	 The states with the best-designed waste-end taxes are 
California, Minnesota, and New York. Their taxes are 
considered better than other states, because they more 
explicitly account for how the wastes are managed. One of 
the two California taxes, for example, sets rates on the 
basis of "degree-of-hazard" associated with different waste 
streams .. 
10.	 Studies on pollution taxes strongly indicate the significant 
control-cost savings that are likely to occur from replacing 
direct control systems with properly structured taxes. From 
the empirical studies reviewed for this report, the cost 
savings seem impressive. This evidence suggests that a tax on 
hazardous wastes, when used as the principal control policy, 
can be effective for holding down compliance costs for 
industry, while maintaining a targeted environmental quality 
standard. It is not feasible, however, to adopt such a 
system in Illinois at this time. 
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11.	 The biggest threat to society from hazardous wastes can be 
attributed to past and present unsafe land disposal 
technologies. A tax, therefore, should be mainly designed to 
provide industry with additional incentives to shift from 
unsafe land disposal practices to safer, although often more 
expensive, technologies (e.g., incineration, recycling). 
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STRATEGY 
Direct Controls (Performance-Based, 
Technology-Based; 
Waste-End Tax 
(Optimal Tax) 
x 
'J-'. 
[-I. 
Combination Control-Tax Policy 
CISecond-Best" Tax) 
Modified Tax 
~ABLE 1 -- Evaluation of 
Different Policy Strategies 
STRENGTHS 
o	 Effective in achieving predetermined 0 
environmental quality standards 0 
o	 Reduces environmental risks 
~Jhen control-cost and "damageU (} 
information are unreliab:e 0 
o	 Cost-beneficial 0 
o	 Encourages developlnent of safer 0 
waste management technologies 
o	 ?rovides source of revenue for 0 
cleanup of land disposal sites 
o	 Equitable (consis"tent with "polluter 0 
pays': principle:, 
o	 Low administrative costs 0 
o	 Less risky th&! optimal tax for 0 
achieving targeted environmental 0 
quality standard 0 
o	 Cost-effective 
o	 Requires no calculations of damage 
o	 Provides source of revenue for 0 
cleanup of land disposal sites 
o	 Equi table (consistent {¥i th ttpolluter 0 
pays" principle) 0 
a	 Encourages development of safer waste 
management technologies 
o	 Speeds up industry shift 0 
away from land disposal sites 0 
o	 Encourages llsafest tl waste management 0 
practices (e.g., recycling, recovery) 
o	 Provides source of revenue for 
cleanup of land disposal sites 0 
WEAK..NESSES 
Cost-inefficient 
Discourages development of safer than 
minimim waste management technologies 
Costly to administer 
Inequitable (compliance costs not 
related to risks) 
May be politically unacceptable 
Risky when generators' response la 
uncertain 
May be objectionable when controlling 
Uhigh-risk tl hazardous wastes 
rtequires information on control costs 
and damage 
Unfeasible for hazardous wastes 
May not be cost-beneficial 
Requires information on control costs 
May result in "too muchH land 
disposal when control costs are 
underestimated 
May be objectionable when controlling 
"high-risk" hazardous wastes 
May be politically unacceptable 
Risky when generators' response is 
uncertain 
Imposes additional cost to industry. 
May have little benefits to society 
Benefits are seriously reduced 
because q,f stringent HeRA and State 
requirements; and liability 
Interim policy only 
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I. Introduction 
The pUblic is concerned about the dangers of hazardous 
wastes. Moreover, federal and state governments have assessed 
-­
land disposal of hazardous wastes as a major problem and have used 
this assessment to justify stringent and far-reaching regulations. 
This is in spite of great uncertainty about the human health and 
environmental impacts of hazardous wastes. 
Government at all levels over the last few years has taken a 
more active role in controlling potential harm from hazardous 
wastes. The 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 represents an example of ambitious 
environmental law at the Federal level. "Clean Illinois" and 
recent changes in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 
likewise, reflect a commitment on the part of the State of 
Illinois to aggressively control land disposal of hazardous 
wastes. It is safe to say that hazardous wastes have become a 
major, if not the most important, environmental issue of the 
19805. This report is written in response to PA 83-1268, which in 
part requires the Illinois Department of Energy and Natural 
Resources to evaluate the benefits of a hazardous waste fee based 
on the "degree-of-hazard" associated with various waste streams. 
This study attributes a significant part of the "hazardous 
waste" problem to generator's decisions to land-dispose their 
hazardous wastes. Land disposal methods include deep-well 
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injection, surface impoundment, landfilling, and land treatment. 
Landfill leachate contaminating ground water is recognized -by 
experts as a serious environmental problem. Faulty surface 
impoundment is another, evident by the fact that one-third of the 
"Superfund" sites are known to containg leaking surface 
impoundments. Some experts label surface impoundments as "worst 
case" landfills. There is some concern too that waste injected 
into deep wells may contaminate underground water supplies. 
This report presents the "hazardous waste" problem from an 
economic standpoint. From this perspective, hazardous waste is 
considered a social problem requiring control by government 
regulations when third-parties harmed from these wastes are not 
compensated by the polluter. Put more simply, the existance of 
significant external effects namely, the generation and 
disposal of hazardous wastes that injure "third parties" is a 
necessary condition for government intervention. 
Once a decision is made to have some type of government 
control, a convincing argument can be made that incentive-based 
strategies, such as taxes, marketable permits, or other 
market-oriented policies are most appropriate for controlling 
pollutants. A major part of this study examines the theoretical 
support for and viability of imposing a tax on hazardous wastes. 
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II. Policy strategies for Controlling Hazardous Wastes 
Several policy strategies are available for alleviating 
environmental problems such as land disposal of hazardous 
wastes. In accordance with economic theory, a strategy should be 
designed to improve social welfare, rather than just reduce 
-­
harmful pollutants The object of environmental 
regulations, therefore, should be to decrease damages (risks) 
when this produces a net benefit for society. The economic 
rationale for government intervention is based on the premise that 
the private parties responsible for polluting are not held fully 
liable for the third-party (external) costs they impose on the 
rest of society. When the societal cost of ground water 
contamination from land-disposed hazardous wastes is not being 
paid for by industry, for example, an economic rationale for 
governmental intervention to control this activity is evident. 
The economic argument is that with proper governmental actions,the 
net social welfare effect can be improved. That is, when firms 
are required to pay for the costs of their pollution, society as a 
whole is better off. This is the basis for the increased role 
that federal and state governments have recently assumed for 
hazardous waste management. Much of the existing hazardous waste 
regulation can be attributed to the Love Canal incident, which led 
the pUblic to consider for the first time hazardous waste as a 
major environmental problem that required stringent governmental 
controls. 
Socially desirable environmental regulation considers both 
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the benefits and costs of abating pollutants. since scarce 
resources are used to control pollutants, costs are imposed upon 
society -- for example, industry takes on additional costs when it 
manages its hazardous wastes by treatment and recycling instead of 
by land disposal. The benefits of controlling pollutants (e.g., 
land-disposed waste) include lowering the risk to society (e.g., 
health and property damage). While benefits, particularly thgse 
accruing from safer waste management, are difficult to measure, 
any sound environmental policy should implicitly balance costs 
and benefits. The omission of benefit measurements from policy 
analysis does not, however, preclude jUdging alternative types of 
environmental regulations. Several studies (see Baumol and oates, 
1979; Griffin, 1974; Kneese and Blair, 1968; Lof and Kneese, 1968; 
O'Neil et al., 1983; Perl and Dunbar, 1982; Watson, 1974) have 
convincingly shown that current environmental regUlations have 
resulted in higher-than-necessary costs to meet specified 
environmental quality targets (i.e., the same benefits can be 
attained at a much lower cost). In fact, this is considered by 
many as the major deficiency of existing environmental 
regUlations. The critics have pointed out that these regUlations 
were designed with too little consideration given to their 
economic effect (see Table 2 for a list of the major criticisms of 
the existing regUlatory process). The often-used argument that 
better regUlations cannot be adopted because of our lack of 
knowledge about benefits from a cleaner environment is, therefore, 
amiss. 
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Table 2 - - Some criticisms of the
 
Environmental Regulatory Process
 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Has in some cases resulted in 
higher-than-necessary costs to meet specified 
environmental quality standards (some 
economists regard this as the major symptom of 
bad regulation*; economists generally favor 
pollution taxes and issuing or auctioning 
pollution permits over prescriptive pollution 
control standards). 
Little consideration given to the economic 
effects of regulatory policies. 
Inadequate oversight by legislative and 
executive branches. 
Cleaner environment is viewed as a goal per se 
rather than as a way to improve 
welfare. 
social 
Poor (or lack of) coordination between 
programs and agencies. 
* See Perl and Dunbar, 1982, Delaware Estuary (Kneese et al., 
1971); and Fox River studies (O'Neil et al., 1983). 
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A list of major strategy categories for controlling damage 
from hazardous wastes is given below: 
o	 Direct Controls ("command and control" regulation) 
o	 Voluntary Actions 
o	 Incentive-Based Policies (e.g., taxes, marketable 
permits, subsidies, "bubble" policy, deposit-refund 
system) 
o	 others (e.g., research funding, government ownership of 
polluting facilities) 
While no detailed discussion on the merits of each control 
strategy is presented here, a few observations will be made. 
Direct controls are the most common type of policy in the united 
states. Direct controls may include performance-based or 
technology-based standards, and civil and criminal enforcement. 
For example, a new RCRA requirement (effective May 8, 1985), 
stating that landfills and surface impoundments must have a double 
liner/double collection system, is a technology-based regulation. 
Our air and water quality rules can be best characterized as 
direct controls (e.g., technology-based effluent standards of the 
Clean Water Act). Economists and others have been highly critical 
of direct controls because of their inefficiencies in controlling 
pollutants. Direct controls do not take into account the fact 
that costs and benefits of controlling emissions differ among 
sources of pollutants; and direct controls provide industry with 
little incentive to develop new pollution-abatement technologies. 
Voluntary actions can be jUdged as an ineffective strategy 
for controlling pollutants. tlJawboning" (persuasion) by 
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governments without the threat of penalty is a weak policy. Firms 
will generally pollute less only if it is in their best interest. 
In the case of hazardous waste, pressures placed by the local 
citizenry are probably more effective. The expedient attitude 
exhibited by some firms in the past demonstrates little social 
consciousness on their part. 
Incentive-based policies, which include a hazardous wa~te 
tax, are the most attractive from an economic perspective. As 
shown later, studies suggest that incentive-based policies can 
greatly lower the costs of current environmental protection. 
These findings have implications for developing policies to 
control land disposal of hazardous wastes. Recently, the u.s. 
EPA has supported incentive-based policies and has proposed 
before the U.S. Congress that a waste-end tax be adopted both to 
provide revenues for Superfund and to discourage land disposal by 
industries. This proposal is more fUlly discussed later in the 
report. The U.S. EPA has also promoted a "bubble" policy to 
reduce the costs of controlling air pollutants. This policy 
permits existing sources to use accumulated emissions credits to 
meet the state inplementation plan (SIP). 
Marketable permits represent a type of incentive-based policy 
that many analysts consider even more attractive than a tax system 
(see oates, 1985). Under this policy, a government authority 
would either issue a fixed number of transferable permits for 
pollutant emissions or auction them off to the highest bidders. 
In comparison with a tax, marketable permits reduce the 
uncertainty in attaining a specified level of environmental 
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quality. This is because the responsible governmental agency 
controls the number of emissions permits that are auctioned off~or 
issued. Wisconsin recently adopted a new policy of issuing 
transferable permits for managing water quality on the Fox River 
(see O'Neil et al., 1983). Such a mechanism seems to have the 
potential, as does a tax, for controlling the costs to industry of 
shifting from land disposal to other waste-management practices. 
critics of a tax policy argue that it gives industry "a license 
to pollute" and is difficult to enforce. One significant reason 
for the resistance to a tax policy in the united States may be the 
legal background of those responsible for writing environmental 
rules. These policymakers may be skeptical of market-based rules 
that are designed to correct a market problem. A review of the 
attractiveness and the deficiencies of a pollution tax is 
presented in the next section. 
A subsidy is another example of an incentive-based policy 
firms are rewarded for not polluting. In the case of hazardous 
waste, the generator could be paid a subsidy for treating or 
recycling its waste rather than land-disposing it. Beyond the 
equity issue of why a firm should be rewarded for IIdoing something 
that it should already be doing," the subsidy may attract new 
firms, thereby stimulating the generation of more wastes in the 
long term. 
Another incentive-based policy is a deposit-refund system. 
Such a system is used today in West Germany to control waste oil 
(see Irwin, 1978) and in the united States to regulate beverage 
containers (see Baumol and oates, 1979). Under this system, a 
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generator would pay a deposit to the responsible governmental 
agency. The deposit may be of an amount reflecting environmental 
damages of poorly managed wastes (e.g., surface impoundment). The 
full deposit, or a part of it, may be refunded only after the 
generator has verified to the agency that the waste was safely 
managed. As an example, a deposit of $50 per ton may be require~, 
which corresponds to the damages of land-disposing the waste. If 
the generator demonstrates that the waste was treated, 
incinerated, or recycled, all or a portion of the deposit ($50 per 
ton) may be refunded. Compared to a tax system, a deposit-refund 
policy has the advantages of deterring illegal dumping and of 
reducing administrative costs the burden is placed on the 
generator to demonstrate that its waste was properly handled. 
Experience with this type of policy has shown it to be successful 
in improving environmental quality. Oregon's "Bottle Bill" 
approach, which imposes a mandatory deposit on beverage 
containers, has been effective in reducing litter and solid waste 
(see Baumol and Oates, 1979). The German waste oil program is 
viewed in other European countries as a model plan for waste 
control. It was designed to cut back on administrative costs and 
to promote recycling. 
other governmental policies, such as research funding and 
government ownership of hazardous waste facilities, may be adopted 
for controlling land-disposal practices. In west Germany, for 
example, the government and the private sector jointly own many of 
the hazardous waste disposal facilities. controlling hazardous 
wastes by government ownership of facilities is justified only 
9 
when market forces and less interventionist policies are found 
ineffective. There is little evidence that supports government 
ownership of hazardous waste facilities, or of other types of 
physical capital, in this country. If anything, this 
environmental strategy would likely increase the costs of waste 
management because of governmental inefficiencies. Research 
funding for technology development by the government may _be 
defensible. Research could be partly financed by a hazardous 
waste tax, if research activities for waste management 
technologies undertaken by the private sector are deemed 
deficient. The reason is that research findings are often not 
proprietary. Benefits accrue not only to the firm sponsoring the 
research, but to competing firms as well. Therefore, private 
firms are likely to underinvest in research. This argument 
applies most to basic research, rather than to the 
commercialization of waste-management technologies. Of course, 
how much the private sector is willing to spend on developing or 
commercializing new technology is strongly dependent upon 
incentives provided by existing regulations and market forces. 
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III. The Attractiveness of a Tax System 
As discussed earlier, a pollution tax can be an 
effective mechanism for protecting the environment. By 
discouraging land disposal of hazardous wastes, a properly 
structured tax that is feasible to administer can greatly 
lower the costs to industry of compliance, as compa~ed 
with other policy strategies (e.g., uniform reduction 
standard, non-marketable permitting). To the extent that 
stringent regulations are now, or will soon be, in effect to 
control land disposal of hazardous wastes, however, the 
potential benefits of a tax are seriously reduced. Just as 
importantly, the question of liability encourages responsible 
disposal. As stated earlier, it is within this context that 
the effectiveness and workability of a modified hazardous 
waste tax for Illinois needs to be evaluated. The next 
section presents a theoretical discussion of the advantages 
of a tax scheme over other environmental strategies. section 
v provides some empirical support, based on the results of 
several stUdies, for adopting a pollution tax. The remainder 
of this section lists some of the reasons why a hazardous 
waste tax may be an atttractive policy tool for controlling 
land disposal of hazardous wastes. 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have pointed out 
the advantages of a pollution tax relative to other policy 
alternatives. Some of these studies are discussed later in 
the report. Many of them attempted to show the 
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inefficiencies of a system of direct controls the type 
that has dominated environmental regulation in our country. 
While no such study has been performed for hazardous waste 
regulation, because of the relatively recent enactment of 
legislation, the suggestions and conclusions made in these 
studies are likely to have broader implications. The nature 
of the "land disposal" problem is not unlike that of air C!nd 
water pollutants -- they all represent a serious externality 
problem (the polluter imposes an environmental cost on 
society that the polluter is not fully held liable for, 
thereby producing or land-disposing an excessive amount of 
pollutants) . 
The arguments for a hazardous waste tax as an 
alternative to direct controls are summarized below: 
1.	 Economic efficiency ( economic welfare) is improved. A 
policy strategy that attempts to maximize economic 
efficiency (i.e., minimizes the combined control costs 
and remaining damages) must consider that control costs 
(the costs of alternatives to land disposal) vary across 
generators and that benefits of reduced land disposal 
also vary across generators, dependent upon facility 
location, toxic content of the wastes, and other factors. 
Direct controls where each generator is sUbject to the 
same standard requirements, do not account for these 
variations. Direct controls are likely to lead to 
higher-than-necessary costs for achieving a given level of 
land-disposal control and to an imbalance between the 
12
 
aggregate benefits and the costs of control. When the 
benefit value for additional hazardous waste control -is 
not measurable, this study shows that a tax is still 
superior to a direct control system as a cost-effective 
control mechanism. 
2.	 The discussion in (1) addresses the short-term benefit of 
a tax system. In the long term, an incentive-based tax 
(i.e., a tax designed to discourage land-disposal 
practices) would provide industry with a stronger 
incentive for developing new waste-management 
technologies. Since generators would benefit from these 
new technologies by paying less tax, the marketplace 
would have additional incentives for their development. 
Under a direct control system, firms are less inclined to 
develop methods to manage waste beyond those prescribed 
by law. In summary, a tax system can provide a direct 
and powerful incentive for generators to reduce social 
damages from land disposal. Section IV presents a fuller 
discussion of this defense of a hazardous waste tax. 
3.	 Related to (1)and (2), a tax system is more effective than 
direct controls in reducing economic welfare losses 
because of pollutants. That is, when pollution causes 
society's well-being to decrease, a tax is superior to 
direct controls in correcting the problem. 
4.	 As a secondary effect, a tax provides a source of revenue 
for the cleanup of land disposal sites and for other 
13 
governmental activities. By using all or some of the tax 
receipts for cleanup, the costs for these activities are 
being imposed on those who are partly responsible for 
past mismanagement practices. 
5.	 A tax is more equitable in its application of the 
"polluter pays" principle. By setting a tax that 
reflects the damage to society from land disposal, those 
who inflict greater harm on society are burdened with a 
higher tax. For example, generators who land-dispose 
"high risk" wastes would be charged a higher tax rate. 
This can be defended on both economic-efficiency and 
equity grounds. By differentiating between wastes on the 
basis of "degree-of-damage," a tax system poses a greater 
penalty on those who do the most damage an action 
commensurate with equity. Unfortunatley, such a tax seems 
unworkable given our scarce knowledge of the adverse 
social impact form hazardous wastes. 
6.	 A tax system is more adaptable in that the tax structure 
can easily be adjusted to account for new information. 
If, for example, it is found that the tax rate assessed 
on generators is "too low" to influence waste-management 
practices, the tax rate can be increased. A tax should 
be viewed as an iterative policy tool capable of 
responding to the behavior of the polluters (e.g., a tax 
with little effeqt on land-disposal practices should be 
reset at a higher value). 
7.	 A tax is less costly to administer than direct controls 
14 
since the monitoring activities of the regulatory agency 
are likely to be reduced. The major reason for this -is 
that the generator's incentives to dispose of wastes 
properly are increased if the threat of a tax exists. 
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IV. Issues in Tax Design and Implementation 
The classical economic argument for environmental regulation 
is that a firm, when not bearing the costs to society of its 
polluting, will make excessive use of environmental resources. 
The goal of environmental policies should, therefore, focus on 
giving these firms incentives to control their pollutants. 
Specifically, government should impose a price on damaging 
pollutants. This price ( effluent tax) should be set at a level 
equal to the damage from each additional unit of pollutant. By 
imposing such a tax, government will induce firms to control their 
pollutants at a socially desirable level. Unfortunately, because 
of the great difficulties involved in predicting the damage from 
pollutants in terms of either physical effects (aesthetic losses, 
health effects) or pecuniary value, setting an optimal tax becomes 
unworkable. Notwithstanding this constraint, a pollution tax 
labeled in this report a "second-best" tax emerges as a 
cost-effective policy strategy for controlling pollutants at some 
targeted level (e.g., minimizing the control costs of reducing 
land-disposed wastes to a targeted level). 
This section presents a theoretical discussion on the 
workings of a tax system for land disposal of hazardous wastes. 
It will first demonstrate how an optimal tax is set for an 
individual generator. Assumptions are later made about whether 
accurate estimates of the damage function ("degree-of-damage") 
for land disposal exist. The implications of this for designing a 
pollution tax are discussed. This section also points out some of 
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the major issues and problems in tax design and implementation. 
The problems are presented to show that a waste-end tax may not 
be a workable policy for controlling land disposal. Instead, 
marketable permits (which, as stated earlier, have recently gained 
in popularity) may prove to be more effective as an 
incentive-based policy for controlling land disposal of hazardous 
wastes. A detailed discussion of marketable permits falls outside 
the scope of this report. Marketable permits are potentially an 
attractive technique for controlling land disposal of hazardous 
wastes (see oates, 1984). 
A. The Theoretical Effects of a Tax on Land Disposal 
Land disposal is viewed here as a problem that results from 
the lack of adequate economic incentives for a generator to bear 
the real cost to land-dispose the hazardous wastes the generator 
produces. The generator pays the costs of purchasing resources 
for on-site land disposal or the costs of hiring an outside party 
to dispose of its wastes. The costs to the victims of land 
disposal, however, are "external" to the generator, since they are 
borne by the rest of society. It is for this reason that the 
market fails and governmental intervention is rationalized. 
Figure 1 illustrates this problem. 
In Figure 1, the line MD represents the marginal damage 
associated with land-disposed waste (e.g., the adverse effect, in 
dollar terms, from an additional ton of land-disposed waste). 
The marginal damage is assumed to rise with an increase in land 
disposal. This is an empirical question which has some validity, 
at least as suggested by studies of air and water pollutants. 
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Damages may include health, aesthetic and other types of external 
effects imposed on society for which the generator is not held 
fully liable. The marginal cost to the generator of controlling 
land disposal is shown in Figure 1 as MC (reading from right to 
left). It represents the locus of least-cost practices available 
to the generator for reducing land disposal at different levels. 
The assumption is made that marginal control costs rise at a lower 
level of land disposal. This relationship is consistent with 
empirical evidence on the marginal control costs for other 
pollutants (see Baumol and oates, 1975 and 1979; Griffin, 1974; 
Kneese et al., 1968). The control costs to the generator may 
involve employing safer and more expensive waste-management 
techniques, and/or generating less hazardous wastes by 
sUbstituting other inputs for certain chemical feedstocks. 
In the absence of governmental intervention, the amount of 
land disposal for a single generator's waste is assumed LD (see
o 
Figure 1). The generator is land-disposing an excessive amount 
of wastes; at a lower level, there is a net welfare gain to 
society,as shown below. By controlling land disposal at LD*, for 
example, the net welfare gain is measured as the cross-hatched 
area (BCD). Conversely, area (BCD) equals the welfare loss from 
excessive land-disposal by the generator. In controlling land 
disposal at LD*, which is shown below to be the optimum, damages 
are reduced by area (BeEF) and control costs are increased by area 
(BDEF). The difference in the two areas is area (BCD), which 
equals the net economic welfare gain (loss) from land-disposing at 
LD* (LD ).o
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B. The Optimal Tax 
1. A Single Generator 
Figure 1 illustrates the response of a profit-maximizing (or 
cost-minimizing) generator to an optimal tax on land-disposed 
wastes. As in the last section, it is assumed that the generator 
is not held liable for any of the damages imposed on society by 
land-disposed wastes. In the absence of a tax, the level of land 
disposal is LD (see Figure 1). A tax system is now adopted. Tax 
o 
rates are set corresponding to the marginal damages at each level 
of land disposal. This tax is characterized as an "optimal tax." 
The marginal damage function (MD) represents the marginal tax 
schedule (i.e., the tax rate declines at higher levels of 
control) • Faced with such a tax, the generator has the incentive 
to reduce the amount of land-disposed wastes to LD*. At LD*, the 
generator minimizes the sum of its control costs, area (BDEF) and 
tax payments, area (ABF). If instead, the generator still 
continues to land-dispose at LD , the net cost to the generator is 
o 
measured as the sum of area (GCBH) and area (BCD). 
The level of land disposal at LD* is also socially desirable 
(welfare-maximizing) the sum of control costs and damages is 
minimized. At LD ' as shown above, this sum is greater by the 
o 
level measured as area (BCD). The economic welfare loss from land 
disposal at LD relative to LD* is therefore equal to the excess 
o 
of damages over control costs. Strictly speaking, the optimal 
condition that the sum of control costs and damages should be 
minimized assumes a risk-neutral society. Existing regulatory 
policies seem to be premised on a society willing to expend more 
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to reduce the risks of hazardous wastes than what it expects to 
gain (i.e., a risk-averse society). It should be noted here that 
a pollution tax, unlike other types of taxes, is explicitly 
designed to improve economic welfare (i.e., to correct the 
economic problem of "too much" pollution). 
In summary, the tax schedule shown in Figure 1 represents an 
optimal tax in that it results in land disposal at a level where 
marginal control costs equal marginal damages (i.e., marginal 
benefits of control). Alternatively, a uniform tax of t*, or a 
subsidy set at t*, or a land-disposal standard at LD* would all 
produce an optimal level of land disposal. 
A standard set at LD* may, however, lead to control costs 
that are higher than the lowest attainable level. When, for 
example, regulations specify the technology that must be used to 
manage hazardous wastes, the realized cost of control may be 
greater than that reflected by the locus MC (i.e., the marginal 
control costs for the required technology may be to the right of 
the least-cost alternative). From a long-term perspective, the 
tax system would also provide the marketplace with more 
incentives to develop new waste-management technologies. This 
means that the marginal control cost line (MC) will shift more to 
the left over time when a tax system is adopted instead of direct 
controls. 
Finally, to the degree that existing regulations discourage 
land disposal of hazardous wastes, the net benefits from a 
hazardous waste tax may be seriously reduced. If in fact adequate 
incentives now exist, a tax may cause "too little" land disposal. 
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Since, as pointed out earlier, federal and state regulations may 
be providing generators with sufficient incentives, -an 
incentive-based hazardous waste tax may not be justified. 
2. Two Generators 
Figure 2 demonstrates the cost-reducing effect of imposing a 
un1form. tax at t * on two generators. Th1s. tax corresponds to the 
horizontal marginal damage function (MD). It is assumed here that 
the tax replaced a performance-based control set at LDc . with a 
tax at t * , generator I, whose marginal control costs are shown in 
Figure 2 as MC1 , will land-dispose its hazardous wastes at LD * 1 
(where t * = MCl ); the optimal land disposal for generation 2 is 
LD2 * (where its marginal control costs (MC2 ) intersect the tax of 
t *). In this simplified example of a uniform tax, the marginal 
control costs of the two polluters are equal at their respective 
optimal level of land disposal (LD*l and LD *). An attractive2 
feature of a tax is that it will lead to more control of land 
disposal where the costs are lowest. Figure 2 shows this -- the 
land disposal of generator 2's waste is controlled beyond the 
level for generator 1. Generator 2 is also the lower-cost 
generator. 
In comparison, let us assume that a government regulation 
sets a standard specifying that the maximum level of land disposal 
for each generator is LDc . For simplicity, by assuming 2LDc = 
LD*l + LD*2 -- namely, the tax and standard regulations will 
produce the same amount of land disposal across the two generators 
both policies will have the same damage-reducing effect. The 
different economic impact produced by each policy is then simply 
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reflected by the control costs. The cross-hatched area in Figure 
2 measures the higher cost of control when a standard is set --at 
LDc , instead of a tax set at t*. This points to a source of 
inefficiency of standards (relative to a tax system) that will 
occur as long as marginal control costs vary among firms. 
3. "Damage" Tax 
The damage done by land disposal is site-specific and 
dependent upon such factors as the location of the disposal 
facility, the toxicity and physiochemical properties of the 
disposed waste, and the type of land-disposal technology. The 
damage done by hazardous wastes can be simply expressed as 
D = f(H,T,L) 
where the damage (D) is a function of the inherent hazard 
("degree-of-hazard") of the waste stream (H), the waste management 
technology (T), and the location of disposal and other management 
facilities (L). A waste stream that is considered highly 
hazardous contains substances with the following characteristics: 
highly toxic and mobile, persistent in the environment, and a 
strong tendency to bio-accumulate. Proper location of disposal 
facilities is regarded by some experts as the most important 
factor in protecting ground water from contamination by releases 
of hazardous wastes that are stored, disposed, or treated in land 
facilities. 
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In Figure 3 (unlike Figure 1 and 2), it is assumed that the 
marginal damages associated with land disposal vary across 
generators. Figure 3 shows that the land disposal of generator 
l's waste is more damaging (less safe) than that of generator 2. 
An optimal tax would account for this by placing a higher tax rate 
on generator 1. Specifically, with the marginal control costs 
assumed equal for the two generators (MCl = MC2 ) , the optimal tax 
rates would be t*l' and t*2' respectively, for generator 1 and 2. 
It can be shown that placing the same tax on each generator would 
result in lower economic welfare. 
A theoretical foundation clearly exists for setting a 
"damage" tax on hazardous waste. The potential benefits of a tax 
are only realized when the tax rates that are set account for 
variations in marginal damage among sources of hazardous wastes. 
The benefits of controlling a ton of land-disposed waste are not 
uniform across sites and waste streams. A policy strategy should, 
therefore, account for the varying marginal damages. This not 
only implies that different tax rates should be placed on 
generators, but also that different types of pOlicy strategies may 
be mandated. A hazardous waste that is highly toxic, for example, 
should possibly be banned -- the risk in setting a tax may be 
socially unacceptable. Put simply, one disadvantage of a tax is 
that it allows the market to set the level of land disposal. How 
polluters will respond to a tax is unknown at the time the tax is 
implemented. 
Table 3 illustrates this point further. Let us assume that 
there are three categories of hazardous wastes by "degree-of­
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damage" low, moderate, and high. The classification of 
different wastes into one of the three groups is based on the risk 
associated with a specific waste stream, which mostly depends un 
the inherent chemical/physical properties of the waste, the 
management strategy and technology used, and the location of the 
waste-management facility. A waste stream with a high 
"degree-of-damage, " for example, may include a highly toxic waste 
that is disposed by surface impoundment. For this waste strea~, 
the optimal strategy may be to ban it. For a low-risk waste 
stream, as shown in Table 3, an optimal tax may be the proper 
strategy. Such a tax may be uniform and set at a low rate to 
reflect the "low" damage of this waste stream. For moderate- and 
high-risk waste streams, a direct control policy combined with a 
tax and/or a permit system, may be most appropriate. This is the 
type of system currently in effect. A tax policy alone may be too 
risky, since there is the problem of predicting how polluters will 
respond in terms of controlling the land-disposal of their wastes. 
Setting a tax on a highly toxic waste stream may expose society to 
excessive risk; the tax may be set too low to produce any marked 
change in management strategies. Finally, the tax rate for more 
risky waste streams may be variable and higher, reflecting the 
greater damage of such waste streams, particularly within a 
low-control range. 
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c. "Second-Best" Tax 
An optimal tax, as discussed above, requires measuring the 
reduced damages (benefits) and control costs associated with less 
risky management practices. Particularly because of the 
difficulties of measuring the damages of hazardous wastes, an 
optimal tax becomes unworkable. A recent study by the 
universities Associated for Research and Education in Pathology, 
Inc. (UAREP) concluded that: 
There is a great disparity between the pUblic 
perception of the human health effects 
attributable to chemicals in disposal sites 
and the current scientific evidence on this 
sUbject (see UAREP. p. a-II) ... [Studies' 
results] cannot be interpreted to indicate 
that no risk exists but, rather, that no 
serious health effects clearly attributable to 
the sites have been detected to date by the 
study methods employed (UAREP, p. a-I). 
Experts seem to agree only that the damages of hazardous 
wastes on the environment are potentially great. An overriding 
concern is that improper disposal can contaminate drinking water 
supplies; the water becomes unfit for drinking and the waste may 
contain carcinogenic or toxic substances, in which case such 
contamination may have serious health effects. 
A "second-best" tax involves setting a tax with the intent of 
achieving a targeted standard for land disposal practices at the 
lowest attainable cost. Unlike a pure {optimal} tax system, the 
combination control-tax system (a "second-best" tax) reduces the 
risk of serious environmental damage. Unless, of course, the 
available information grossly underestimates the costs to 
industry of reducing land disposal. The reason is that the 
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combination approach sets a tax which is contingent upon the 
designated standard for the amount of land disposal. 
In Figure 4, a tax set at t* may not be optimal in the sense 
of balancing costs and benefits, even though it does provide the 
generator with an incentive to land-dispose at the level of LD* 
(since any land disposal greater or less than LD* will increase 
the sum of the generator's control costs and tax liabilities). 
The reason why the tax is not optimal is that such a tax 
labeled here as a "second-best" tax -- does not explicitly account 
for damages associated with land disposal. The tax at t*, 
however, will likely induce the use of least-costly control 
techniques. The pure (optimal) tax system attempts to optimize 
the level of pollutants, whereas a combination control-tax system 
has no such goal. Instead, it is designed to minimize the cost of 
achieving a specified level of pollution. The optimal tax system 
is therefore designed to yield a cost-beneficial impact on 
society, while the combination system represents a cost-effective 
strategy. It can be shown that in comparison with a strict 
control policy, which may specify either a uniform reduction in 
pollutants by each firm or a specific control technology to be 
used or both, a combined control-tax system is more efficient (see 
Baumol and oates, 1975; qnd Mills, 1978). 
When control costs are underestimated, the tax would produce 
"too much" pollution. In Figure 4, for example, if the true 
marginal control costs are represented by Me', a tax at t* will 
produce excessive land disposal in the amount of LD'-LD*. When 
in setting the tax rate the control costs are underestimated, the 
30 
generator's willingness to pay the tax of t*, rather than to 
expend more money for control, will be greater than anticipated 
when control costs are projected as the Me line. 
A variant of the "second-best" tax, and one which would 
probably face less resistance by industry, is a "threat" tax. 
Such a system would involve tax payments by the firm only when 
polluting exceeds some targeted level. In Figure 4, for example, 
no tax would be imposed on the generator as long as ~ts 
land-disposed waste does *not exceed LD. A tax higher than *t, 
however, . *.may be assessed for land d1sposal beyond LD. A h1gh tax 
would discourage land disposal in addition to LD* by making it 
costly for the generator to do so. 
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D. Hazardous Waste Tax and Existing Regulations 
The federal government and the state of Illinois have 
recently implemented stringent regulations aimed at discouraging 
land disposal of hazardous wastes. The 1984 amendments to the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are designed in part 
to control land disposal of hazardous wastes. The amendments 
were written in response to heavy criticism of the original RCRA, 
which was signed into law in 1976. critics contended that the 
"old" RCRA needed changing because of its loopholes, vague 
language, and relaxed regulations. subtitle C of RCRA gives the 
u.s. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) a broad mandate 
to write regulations setting standards on hazardous waste 
management practices. For example, RCRA requires the U.S. EPA 
to promulgate rules of standards for licensing, operating, and 
long-term care of hazardous waste facilities. To give the 
U.S. EPA an incentive to write regulations, the amended RCRA 
contains a "hammer" provision requiring the EPA to meet the 
deadlines stipulated in the Act, or specified disposal techniques 
will be altogether banned. 
RCRA also gives the U.s. EPA the authority to approve state 
programs on an interim or permanent basis. At the minimum, a 
state program is required to adopt EPA-written regulations if the 
state hopes to obtain interim authorization of its program. The 
two most significant RCRA requirements are identification and 
listing of hazardous wastes and standards for handling their 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal; and a 
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manifest system for tracking hazardous wastes from the generator 
to its disposal site. RCRA places most of the responsibility for 
waste management on the generators who must determine whether the 
wastes are hazardous. If they are, they must notify the u.s. EPA 
and then safely dispose of the wastes. 
It is clear that the spirit of RCRA is to restrain the use 
-­
of different types of land disposal. It does this by impos!ng 
strict technological requirements on landfills and by encouraging 
alternative waste management practices, such as treatment, 
incineration, and recycling. RCRA can best be described as a type 
of "command-and-control" regulation whose major intent is to set 
standards on land disposal of hazardous wastes. 
Illinois' environmental laws on hazardous wastes are among 
the strictest in the country. Pursuant to Illinois law, for 
example, the land disposal of hazardous wastes is prohibited 
beginning in 1987, unless industry can demonstrate that 
alternatives are not "economically reasonable or technically 
feasible" (P.A. 82-572) . The rules specifying the workings of 
P.A. 82-572 have not yet been written by the responsible parties 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the 
Illinois Pollution Control Board (IPCB). Further, the disposal of 
liquid hazardous wastes in landfills in Illinois is now 
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prohibited unless a variance is obtained from IEPA. Illinois 
applies a permit system of regulation. The state's EPA issues 
permits to generators for disposing of a specific waste stream at 
a selected site. 
Existing Illinois law may already discourage land disposal of 
hazardous wastes by imposing a hazardous waste disposal fee on 
industry (see Illinois Rev. stat. Ch.l11 1/2 Sec. 22.2). Revenues 
from this tax are placed in the Hazardous Waste Fund and the 
Hazardous Waste Research Fund. A fee of $0.03 (3 cents) per 
gallon (or $6.06 per cubic yard) is levied on the hazardous wastes 
that are land-disposed either on-site or off-site. A lesser fee, 
$0.01 (1 cent) per gallon, is levied on the treatment of hazardous 
wastes. A lump sum fee (ranging from $2,000 to $9,000, depending 
on volume) is imposed when a hazardous waste is placed in an 
underground injection well. Although the fee may have some effect 
on controlling land-disposal practices, its main intents are to 
provide matching funds for "Superfund" grants from the federal 
government and to fund research. The Superfund requires states to 
pay 10 percent of the cleanup costs and all operating and 
maintenance costs after the first year. The hazardous waste fee 
appears too low to encourage safer management practices. It is 
important to note here that a major objective of this report is to 
assist in determining whether or not more explicit 
incentive-based waste-end tax should be adopted to further 
discourage land disposal of hazardous wastes in Illinois. 
other incentives now exist for industry to select safer waste 
management practices. Whether such incentives are adequate to 
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control damages of hazardous wastes is an issue that should be 
considered when examining an incentive-based hazardous waste 
tax. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or "Superfund"), 
firms are liable, regardless of who is at fault, for cleanup 
costs and damages caused by past and present waste-management 
-­
practices. The generator of hazardous wastes is liable for toxic 
waste contamination. 
Under common law, which is sometimes referred to as "toxic 
torts," firms can be liable for damages to private parties due to 
toxic waste contamination. This is true even when firms satisfy 
federal and state regulatory standards. In some cases this damage 
may be greater than a firm's total assets. A major problem for 
plaintiffs in court cases is to prove that exposure to a chemical 
found in ground water caused a specific harm. Insurance 
companies have also recently become more reluctant to sell 
policies for environmental impairment and liability protection. 
What all this means is that firms may have incentives, because of 
legal and market constraints, to safely manage their wastes beyond 
the level prescribed by existing statutes. The effect of this is 
similar to a tax -- land-disposal declines but enforcement 
costs may be lower. 
An important question that needs to _ be addressed in 
evaluating a tax on hazardous waste is "Should the State of 
Illinois complement its current regulations, which are designed to 
encourage the safer management of hazardous wastes, by adopting an 
incentive-based waste-end tax?" If the consensus is that existing 
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regulations, fees and liability burdens on generators are 
effective in providing industry with enough incentives -to 
undertake socially desirable waste-management strategies, then 
there is little support for a modified waste-end tax. It is 
within this context that a modified tax must be evaluated. As 
will be discussed later, there is strong theoretical support and 
empirical evidence for adopting an incentive-based tax on 
hazardous wastes if the alternative is to implement a direct 
control system of regulation. The question of whether a waste-end 
tax should be adopted in Illinois, however, becomes more difficult 
to answer since stringent regulations are either already in place 
or will be over the next few years, with no prospects for 
repealing them. Even if a properly structured tax can be designed 
and administered -- a tax that accurately accounts for the varying 
societal risks caused by different waste management practices 
its adoption may have little effect on the amount of land-disposed 
wastes, given the existing regulations and market incentives 
provided to industry. Put simply, a waste-end tax may be an 
"overkill" if an environmental problem is already being 
adequately addressed by existing governmental regulations. On 
the other hand, a tax may represent an optimal policy in speeding 
up industry's response to the land-disposal ban in Illinois, which 
begins in 1987. An incentive-based tax may be justifiable as an 
appropriate interim strategy prior to the 1987 ban. This implies 
that, if an incentive-based tax on hazardous wastes is to perform 
this function, it would need to be implemented as quickly as 
possible. 
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Some of the available evidence suggests that existing state 
and federal regulations have been effective in inducing fewer land 
disposal activities. Based on manifest data for Illinois, the 
percentage of hazardous waste disposed in landfills declined from 
82 percent to 43 percent between 1980-1983. Waste treatment 
increased from 3 percent to 31 percent over the same period (see 
Illinois Hazardous Waste Task Force, Report of the committee on 
Land Disposal, 1983). In summary, there is some empirical 
evidence suggesting that hazardous waste regulations 
influenced Illinois industry to shift from land disposal 
technologies to safer waste-management practices. 
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E. Summary of Issues 
Some of the problems in setting an optimal tax on land 
disposal of hazardous wastes were discussed above. These and 
others are summarized as follows: 
1.	 If the control costs of land disposal are unknown or highly 
speculative, setting a tax to attain a specified 
environmental standard is probably not feasible. While a 
"too low" tax rate may raise sufficient revenues for funding 
targeted programs, it would probably lead to excessive land 
disposal of hazardous wastes. A tax introduces an additional 
risk, when compared with direct controls, because of the 
uncertainty of how the polluters will respond, or, to put it 
in technical jargon, of the tax elasticity (the percentage 
decline in land disposal, given a specific tax rate). For a 
hazardous waste tax to have an incentive effect, the tax 
rate on land disposal should be high enough to offset the 
higher costs of less risky waste-management practices. If it 
is not, then the risks to society from hazardous wastes would 
remain about the same as when no tax is implemented. 
2.	 The feasibility of setting an optimal tax on a pollutant 
depends on the reliability of information used to measure 
pollutant damages. For hazardous wastes, this hinges on the 
inherent nature of wastes, the type_ of land disposal 
technology employed, and the location of the hazardous waste 
facility. The "absence of demonstrable effects on human 
health" from hazard.ous waste disposal (see UAREP, p. 0-8) 
makes it difficult 1::0 implement a formalistic "damage" tax. 
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3.	 When the damages from land disposal are not measurable, the 
"optimal" tax is equivalent to the marginal control costs -~at 
the targeted level of land disposal (see Figure 4). The 
quotes around "optimal" are to denote that while such a tax 
will foster least-cost actions by industry, it may not be 
cost-beneficial (the social costs of the tax may exceed the 
benefits). 
4.	 An optimal tax may be politically infeasible. If damages 
from the land disposal of hazardous wastes are deemed high, 
then correspondingly the optimal tax will be high. This 
tax, along with the control costs induced by the tax, may 
burden generators enough to incite them to oppose it in the 
political arena. studies have shown that, although 
aggregate social welfare is improved, replacing a direct 
control system with a tax scheme will likely result in 
increased costs to polluters (see Kneese et al., 1971). The 
total costs to polluters include both control costs and tax 
payments. A tax may, therefore, have a large effect on the 
profit margins of waste-generating firms by transferring 
wealth from industry to society (with the government as an 
agent) . 
5.	 The stability of revenues generated by a hazardous waste tax 
is inversely related to the strength of incentives created by 
the tax. If the tax is effective in reducing the amount of 
waste that is land disposed, the tax base becomes eroded 
through time. This means that the revenue stream from the 
tax is lowered. Although from an economic perspective this 
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tax may be useful in alleviating a pollution problem, 
government officials who view the tax as an important funding 
source for targeted programs may regard the tax as an 
unreliable long-term source of revenue. 
6. A tax may reduce the hazardous waste problem by providing 
firms with the incentives to undertake safer 
-­
waste-management practices, to generate less waste by input 
sUbstitution and lower production, and to reduce the 
"degree-of-damage" of the waste that is produced. 
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v. Review of Pollution Taxes 
This section reports on different pollution tax systems. 
The federal government in 1980 established a tax on chemical raw 
materials ("feedstock tax system") to provide revenues for the 
Superfund. Superfund also established a tax on the disposal of 
some hazardous wastes. The revenues generated from the tax are 
placed in the Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund. The U!S. 
Congress is now debating the reauthorization of the Superfund 
statute. A major issue is securing sources of revenue for the 
Superfund. The feedstock tax expired in June of this year. This 
tax had provided over 85 percent of the revenues for the 
Superfund. Some groups, including the u.S. EPA and the Chemical 
Manufactures Association, have proposed adopting a hazardous 
tax. The u.S. Senate recently rejected these proposals. 
Twenty-one states have some type of hazardous waste tax. The 
primary purpose of these taxes is to fund cleanup efforts. There 
is also an extensive literature of empirical studies on air and 
water pollution taxes. Both the state taxes and empirical studies 
are discussed in this section. The air pollution studies, in 
particular, compare the economic effects of hypothetical taxes 
(since no air pollution tax exists in the U.S.) with actual 
control systems. The empirical evidence conclusively suggests 
that replacing direct controls with a tax system to control air 
and water pollutants would produce substantial cost savings, 
without jeopardizing environmental quality. 
One expert recently stated that, 
There is now an extensive empirical literature that 
provides estimates on the potential cost-savings of 
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a fee system. These studies reveal the staggering 
waste inherent in our existing [command-and­
control] programs; some studies find, for example, 
that the potential cost-savings to society of fees 
to regulate emissions of a particular pollutant are 
in excess of 90 percent of current EPA programs. 
My own rough estimate based on this work is that 
a well-designed system of pricing incentives 
could achieve our national objectives for clean air 
and water at about 20 to 25 percent of the cost of 
the current [command-and-control] programs. 
(Oates, 1985). 
A. Hazardous Waste Taxes 
1. Federal 
Several taxes exist to control the generation and land 
disposal of hazardous wastes. The Superfund act (CERCLA) 
established a feedstock tax and a waste-end tax. The waste-end 
tax funds the Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund. The major 
purposes of these taxes are to provide funding for the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites, and to fund unexpected problems at disposal 
sites. The u.S. Senate has recently passed a Superfund 
reauthorization bill that includes a broad-base manufacturers' tax 
to supplement the feedstock tax. The federal waste-end tax 
imposes a uniform rate of $2.13 per ton on hazardous wastes 
delivered to permittted disposal facilities. This rate seems 
grossly inadequate for inducing better waste-management practices 
and for reducing waste generation. The u.s. EPA is now examining 
whether this tax should be redesigned or repealed. The two 
federal taxes, and most state waste-end taxes, cannot be labeled 
"pollution taxes." Their major goal is to create a source of 
funding for hazardous waste disposal site cleanups. The 
incentive of most existing hazardous waste taxes to encourage 
43 
less risky waste-management practices are weak. These taxes were 
not explicitly designed for this purpose. 
The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) recently argued 
before the u.s. House of Representatives that a waste-end tax 
should be combined with a feedstock tax to generate sufficient 
revenues for the Superfund over the next five years (see Forney, 
1985). The CMA argued that the tax should be imposed on the wa~te 
disposer, not the generator, as recommended in this study. A 
major reason given in the CMA testimony before Congress was that 
the administrative costs would be lower because there are far 
fewer disposers than generators. The CMA also maintains that a 
facility tax is equitable since the disposers are responsible for 
the Superfund cleanups. Because the tax would likely be passed 
along to generators, the CMA contends that the generator would 
have a direct incentive to either reduce its wastes or manage them 
more safely. The CMA proposed that when a waste is measured on a 
net weight ton basis, the tax rate should be variable 
specifically, a $45 per ton tax for landfill disposal and surface 
impoundment; a $25 per ton tax for ocean dumping or land 
treatment; and a $5 per ton tax for underground injection. The 
CMA proposal would impose no tax for recycling or for conversion 
to non-hazardous wastes within one year. 
The CMA, notwithstanding its vested interests on the issue, 
makes some valid arguments against increasing the expired 
feedstock tax. The major one is that the feedstock tax has only 
an indirect, and probably weak, incentive effect on relieving the 
"hazardous waste" problem. No evidence exists showing whether or 
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not the feedstock tax has resulted in less waste generation. 
In May, the Reagan Administration proposed to the Congress, 
as part of its Superfund reauthorization package, a modified 
version of the u.S. EPA'S waste-end tax proposal. The tax 
contains four different rates, dependent on the type of waste 
management: (1) $35 per ton for land disposal; (2) $5 per ton for 
deep-well injection; (3) $0.25 per ton for wastewater treatmeDt; 
and (4) $6 per ton for incineration, chemical treatment and other 
types of treatment. The rationale for the low tax rate on 
wastewater treatment was that it usually involves treating dilute 
waste streams, which are considered less harmful than land 
disposal of concentrated wastes. The $6 per ton rate for other 
types of treatment, which is higher than the rate for deep-well 
injection, was proposed to generate what the Administration 
considered adequate revenues for financing Superfund. The 
Administration viewed its tax proposal more as a 
revenue-generating source for superfund than as an incentive-based 
policy for discouraging risky management practices. 
2. State 
The Appendix contains a summary of features of the hazardous 
waste taxes for 20 states. Alabama, which has such a tax, was 
excluded because no information was available at the time this 
report was written. The written materials that were reviewed and 
summarized for the Appendix were obtained by telephone 
conversations with staff personnel of the state agencies 
responsible for administering each state's hazardous waste fee(s). 
Some of the information is displayed in tabular form (see Tables 
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Al and A2) : 
1. The effective date of the tax 
2. Taxpayer (e.g., generator, disposer, transporter) 
3. Purpose of tax 
4. Tax rate (maximum/minimum) 
5. 
6. 
Different tax rates 
Penalties for late payment 
--
Some general observations are made here about state taxes on 
hazardous waste: 
1.	 The majority of taxes are designed to provide the state's 
share of the cost for the cleanup of land disposal sites 
either placed on the u.s. EPA's National Priorities List or 
designated by the state. For most states, the revenues 
generated from the taxes have been inadequate for funding 
these activities. 
2.	 The revenues generated by most of the taxes have been small. 
In Florida, for example, an excise tax on hazardous waste 
generation was recently repealed because in its first year 
the total costs of administering the tax exceeded the 
revenues received. There is little evidence, however, that 
the these revenues generated from state taxes are 
consistently falling short of projected levels. 
3.	 Most of the taxes are not structured to provide industry 
with strong incentives to employ safer waste-management 
technologies. This is consistent with the conclusions 
reached in a recent u.s. EPA report (see, Survey of States' 
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Experiences with Waste-end Taxes, August 1984). Although 
some states reported a shifting away from land disposal after 
a tax was imposed, no statistical evidence exists showing 
that the tax was a major factor. Many state taxes have rates 
that differentiate between types of management techniques. 
These rate differentials, however, appear small relative to 
the cost differentials for allternative waste-managem~nt 
actions. In New York, for example, the $18 per ton tax 
differential between landfilled and incinerated wastes is 
sUbstantially lower than the differences in cost of these two 
waste-management alternatives. This is particularly true for 
solids and highly toxic liquids (see Booz Allen, 1983). No 
tax system, other than California's, explicitly accounts for 
the "degree-of-hazard" associated with different waste 
streams (see Appendix) . 
A recent report by the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) stated, 
To act as an economic incentive, that is, to affect 
waste generation and waste management 
significantly, tax rates would have to be about $30 
- $50 per ton of hazardous waste •••.• 
Most of the .... states that have adopted waste-end 
taxes have relatively low rates ... Only six states 
have maximum tax rates high enough to significantly 
affect waste disposal practices. (OTA, 1984, p.46). 
Most of the states have a tax rate in the range of $2 
$20 per ton for land-disposed waste. The $2 rate 
reflects the typical fee for landfilling. Fees for 
incineration and treatments are generally much lower 
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that those for land disposal. 
4.	 The overall impression obtained from discussions with
 
state personnel was that the tax/fee systems are
 
administratively manageable. A major reason for this
 
may be the common requirement that generators must
 
submit periodic reports to the state agency in charge of
 
hazardous wastes.
 
5.	 Generators and operators of hazardous waste facilities are 
most often the parties responsible for paying the tax. Taxes 
on transporters and treatment and storage facilities also 
exist. In several states, both the facility operator and the 
generator pay the tax. 
6.	 There is little evidence that a waste-end tax would
 
significantly increase illegal disposal of hazardous
 
wastes (see Response Analysis, 1984).
 
In summary, most of state waste-end taxes were designed with 
insufficient consideration given to the response of the taxpayers 
in modifying their waste-management practices. For some states 
(e.g., Florida), the fee represents an ad valorem tax, where the 
tax is directly related to the price (or total cost) of the 
selected waste-management practice (see u.s. EPA, August 1984). 
Under such a tax, those applying more expensive, but safer, 
waste-management practices are faced with higher tax payments. 
B. Empirical Evidence on Pollution Taxes 
The empirical evidence on the economic-efficiency effect of a 
tax (or fee) system consistently shows significant potential cost 
savings. The estimated savings in most studies are expressed in 
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terms of reduced control costs attributable to a tax, given a 
specified air or water ambient standard. For most of these 
studies, a tax system is compared with an existing direct control 
policy. A brief review of some of these studies follows. 
Air pollutant studies focused on industry's response to 
effluent taxes. A study by Griffin (1974) estimated that passage 
of the Pure Tax Act of 1972, which would have imposed a tax of 
$0.15 per pound on sulfur dioxide (802) emissions, had the 
potential to improve annual total economic welfare by $6.5 to $7.7 
billion. Running several simulations of an econometric model of 
the electric utility industry, Griffin estimated that a 802 tax 
would reduce sulfur emissions by 85-90 percent. A study by watson 
(1974) on the effect of various fees on emissions of particulate 
matter showed similar results. By imposing a tax of $0.04 per 
pound, Watson estimated the removal of over 99 percent of 
particulate matter. Like Griffin, Watson concluded that the 
benefits of a tax would exceed its costs (i.e., the lowering of 
the total sum of damage and control costs). A recent study by 
Perl and Dunbar (1982) stated that, 
... it is much more important to change how air pollution 
is regulated than to change how much air pollution is 
allowed. That is, currently mandated command and 
control type regul&tions result in much higher costs, 
and possibly dirtier air, than need be. 
The authors apply a linear programming model to show that the 
costs of sulfur dioxide control by the electric utility industry 
could be lowered by 50 percent if the 1970 Clean Air Act and its 
1977 Amendments were replaced by a pollution tax. 
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studies on water effluents -- some of which evaluated actual 
fee systems -- found the same general results. That is, compared 
to direct controls, a tax on water-pollutant emissions would 
likely produce substantial cost savings. A study by Kneese and 
Bower (1968) concluded that replacing a direct control system with 
a tax scheme, given the same level of water quality, would lower 
control costs by one-half. The most cited investigation of water 
effluent fees is the Delaware Estuary study (see Kneese et al., 
1971). The empirical results, which were obtained from an 
optimization model, showed that savings between $3.6 and $8 
million (or between 40 and 72 percent) could result from adopting 
a single (uniform) effluent fee to replace a uniform reduction 
standard. 
studies by Lof and Kneese (1968) and Ethridge (1972) showed 
that small sewerage fees on the beet-sugar and poultry-procuring 
industries could significantly affect levels of water usage and 
BOD (bio-chemical oxygen demand) effluents. These studies, most 
importantly, demonstrate the flexibility of production processes 
in response to an ef,fluent fee. The Lof and Kneese study 
estimated that a sewerage fee on average would reduce 70 percent 
of the BOD in the waste water of a sugar beet processing plant. 
Finally, a study of the effect of effluent fees on industries 
located in the Ruhr River basin in west Germany (see Kneese and 
Bower, 1968) showed a lqrge response by individual firms. After 
the fee was adopted, there was a marked decrease in water intake 
and in waste generation. The Ruhr River experience has 
demonstrated the co-existence of high industrial activity and high 
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environmental quality. 
The results of empirical studies on pollution taxes are 
summarized below: 
1.	 The benefits of a tax over a direct control system are 
directly related to the flexibility of firms to adopt 
economical control alternatives for reducing their tax 
liability. 
2.	 A tax on sulfur dioxide is likely to induce electric 
utilities to switch from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal 
and petroleum, and to adopt pollutant-control technologies. 
A tax on water effluents also is expected to increase the 
demand for "abatement" alternatives. In the long term, new 
technologies are expected to penetrate the marketplace in 
response to a tax scheme. 
3.	 Source-specific standards and technological controls are 
inherently costly and have probably resulted in control costs 
to significantly rise above the lowest attainable level. 
Studies on air/water pollutants (some of which are presented 
in this report) strongly suggest that significant cost 
savings are likely when direct controls are replaced by a 
tax system. 
4.	 Pollution taxes can be a cost-effective mechanism for 
attaining a targeted level of environmental quality. 
5.	 Empirical studies generally have underestimated the benefits 
of a tax because they ignore its positive effect on the 
development of new and less costly "abatement" technologies. 
6.	 Even when a tax system is casually designed, it can be 
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cost-effective in relation to a "command-and-control" system. 
This appears to be the case for water effluent fees adopted 
in the Ruhr River basin and in other areas of Europe (see 
Kneese and Bower, 1968). 
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VI. Comparative Analysis of Alternative Tax Systems 
In evaluating any type of tax, several criteria can -be 
employed. The major ones are as follows: 
1. The total welfare (or incentive) effect on alleviating the 
"pollution" problem. 
The effectiveness of a tax in motivating polluters to 
-­
purchase control technologies heavily depends on the taxaple 
activity (generation, type of waste management) and its 
relationship to damages from polluting. This report 
recommends that if a hazardous waste tax is adopted in 
Illinois, it should be levied on generators. The reason is 
that generators are ultimately responsible under federal and 
state regulations for the safe disposal of hazardous waste, 
and generators decide which waste-management practices are 
employed. A tax on chemical feedstock supplies appears to be 
a weaker incentive, since the link between inputs, production 
process, and land disposal is indirect and most likely weak. 
Taxing a waste-producing input to reduce land disposal 
appears to be an ineffective way to control the hazardous 
waste problem. (see u.S. EPA, December 1984) 
The Illinois Hazardous Task Force recognizes the 
effectiveness of a hazardous waste tax on generators. 
A fee or tax should be imposed on hazardous 
waste generators. The fee should be 
structured so that generators are encouraged 
to: 
-- reduce the amount of waste generated; 
treat hazardous wastes to render them 
nonhazardous; [and] 
-- recover and recycle wastes 
Report of the Committee on Generation (1983) 
p.III-4) 
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2.	 Equity considerations. 
The equity of a hazardous waste tax is based on subjective 
factors and should be examined separately from its 
economic-efficiency effect. Fairness dictates that those who 
are responsible for the "land- disposal" problem should be 
burdened with a tax; or, equivalently, it appears unfair for 
society as a whole to suffer the external costs from~ a 
product some of its members do not consume. One argument is 
that consumers of products should bear the burden of a 
hazardous waste tax, since they are accountable for the 
production of commodities that generate hazardous wastes as a 
by-product. 
The actual incidence of a generator tax (e.g., how much 
of the tax is shifted to consumers?) largely depends on the 
market structure of the waste-producing industries. If these 
industries are competitive, the individual firms are less 
able to pass the tax on to consumers. When this occurs, the 
owners of firms producing the wastes will experience lower 
profits because of the tax. A tax on Illinois generators, 
for example, may weaken their competitive position in selling 
products in the domestic and world markets. The degree to 
which this will occur is contingent on the response of 
consumers to a price rise induced by a tax on waste-producing 
firms. 
3.	 Ease of administration. 
Proponents of a tax on hazardous waste facilities argue that 
a tax on generators will result in a significant cost for tax 
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collection because of the much greater number of generators 
(see Forney, 1985) • Enforcing a hazardous waste tax 
requires collecting of taxes and monitoring waste levels 
and/or management practices. Many tax advocates contend the 
monitoring costs should be lower with a tax system, relative 
to a direct control system, because of the self-interest of a 
polluter to reduce pollutants. 
4. Effect on Illinois' Economy. 
Effects are contingent upon the response of consumers to a 
price change induced by the tax. If the waste-generating 
firms in Illinois operate in a highly competitive market, it 
is more likely that a tax would have an adverse effect on the 
health of these firms. This, of course, assumes that a tax 
is set high enough to have a noticeable effect on the costs 
of waste-generating firms. 
Table 4 illustrates a general methodology for ranking 
different tax systems based on three criteria total 
welfare, equity, and administration. The ranking is based on 
a comparison of the overall scores calculated for each tax. 
Mathematically, the score equals: 
U = ..~;,-, woe 0 00 
) ,c_.. J. J.) 
where u j ' which is equal to the overall score for the jth tax 
system (e.g., feedstock, generator, disposer), is calculated 
as the sum of the product of the weight (wi) assigned to the 
ith criterion (e.g., total welfare, equity, administration) 
and the subaggregate score given to the respective criterion 
(Co.) (e.g., the score for the "equity" impact of a generator
1) 
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tax); u. represents an index that can be used for ranking
J 
different types of taxes. One theoretical decision-rule -- is 
to select the tax system with the highest overall score 
(i.e., choose the tax with the highest u value). 
In practice, calculating numerical scores for each 
tax/criterion combination is not workable. Instead, a 
ranking of each tax with respect to individual criteria can 
be conducted. This study advocates, for example, that a 
generator tax is superior to other types of hazardous' waste 
taxes. From a total welfare (economic-efficiency) 
perspective, a generator tax provides the most direct and 
strongest incentives for controlling land disposal. This 
means that the generator tax is ranked number one on the 
basis of total welfare effect. On equity grounds, the 
generator tax can also be ranked highest. Since the 
generator is the party who decides if wastes should be 
land-disposed, the generator should be burdened with the 
tax. A feedstock may be unfair because it burdens all 
consumers of chemical products, not just those of products 
whose waste is managed unsafely. On the basis of 
administrative ease, both the feedstock and disposer tax may 
be preferred. A feedstock tax appears attractive only when 
the regulator's costs of identifying those who land-dispose 
their waste are prohibitive. This, of course, is not the 
case. 
When the total welfare and equity criteria are highly 
weighted, the generator tax seems superior. Partly because 
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this study assigns a high weight to the total welfare 
criterion, it suggests that a hazardous waste tax, -if 
implemented in Illinois, should be imposed on generators. 
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VII. Summary and Conclusions 
This study examines the major issues in restructuring a tax 
system for controlling hazardous wastes in Illinois. The 
objectives of this study are threefold: (1) to present a 
theoretical framework for identifying the major factors (e.g., the 
"degree-of-damage" of a specific waste stream) that Illinois 
policymakers should take into account in developing an 
incentive-based hazardous waste tax; (2) to review other 
theoretical and empirical studies on pollution taxes; (3) to 
survey hazardous waste taxes in other states and those adopted and 
proposed at the federal leveli and (4) to discuss the 
applicability of economic analysis in developing a hazardous waste 
tax for Illinois. 
The study concludes that a tax on hazardous wastes 
specifically, a tax on generators that considers both the 
"degree-of-hazard" and how a specific waste stream is managed 
is theoretically an attractive policy strategy for controlling 
damages. The study, however, cautions that, in view of existing 
stringent federal and state regulations, and liability burdens on 
generators, a hazardous waste tax to control land disposal in 
Illinois may not be effective. This is particularily true for a 
tax effective after 1986, when the land disposal of hazardous 
wastes in Illinois is expected to decline sharply. It is assumed 
in this study that the major environmental problems from hazardous 
wastes are the result of land disposal practices. 
The states with the best designed hazardous waste taxes are 
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California, Minnesota, and New York. These taxes, compared with 
those in other states, more explicitly account for how the wastes 
are managed. One of the two California taxes sets rates by waste 
category. Discussions with U.S. EPA personnel provided some 
evidence that the waste-end tax in California has had a large 
effect on industry's decision to shift away from landfilling 
wastes. Most state taxes, however, appear deficient in provid!ng 
generators with adequate incentives to encourage safer waste 
management practices. They were designed with the main intent of 
providing funds for cleanup and other state hazardous waste 
activities. 
studies on pollution taxes strongly indicate the significant 
control-cost savings that are likely to occur from replacing 
direct control systems with properly structured taxes, without 
compromising environmental quality. From the empirical studies 
reviewed for this report, the estimated reductions in control 
costs are impressive. This evidence suggests that a tax on 
hazardous wastes can be a cost-effective strategy for controlling 
high-risk waste management. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY OF STATE TAXES ON HAZARDOUS WASTE 

SURVEY OF STATE TAXES ON HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY 
Twenty states were surveyed. The survey list was obtained from 
Office of Technology Assessment/ Superfund Strategy (1984) 
Chapter 2/ page 47/ Table 2.2/ summary of state waste-end tax/fee 
systems. Nineteen of the 20 states were on the list. Florida 
was the one excluded. Four questions were administered by phone 
during the month of May and June (1985); they were: 
1. Could a description of the tax system be sent? 
2. Did the tax generate the expected revenue? 
3. Is this system administratively manageable? and 
4. When was the tax enacted? 
Seven	 basic topics were examined in each of the 20 states/ 
(received information permitting) : 
1. When the system was enacted; 
2. What the purpose(s) of the fee is (will be); 
3. Who pays the fee; 
4. The type of waste management; 
5. Incentive provisions; 
6. Overall impressions from phone interviews; and 
7. The maximum and minimum tax rate. 
All twenty states were summarized and to some extent contrasted. 
The Waste-end Tax/Fee Systems will be defined as/ any tax/fee 
placed on generators and/or facility owners/ and/or transporters 
(depending on the state) of hazardous substances and/or waste. 
All the written information from the twenty states was received 
during the month of June/ 1985. 
TABLE AI: SURVEY OF STATE TAXES ON HAZARDOUS WASTE
 
.. 
STATE EFFECTIVE 
DATE 
TAXPAYER PURPOSE TAX RATE 
(G 
F 
T = 
= GENERATOR 
= FACILITY 
TRANSPORTER) 
(R = REVENUE 
o = OTHER 
I = INCENTIVE 
(X = MAXIMUM 
M = MINIM.UM) 
California 4/1/85 *(F)-Base rate $9.92 (R)-Fund for damages, payments, emer­
(Superfund tax) Base ~ency response, and remedial action re­
rate=$lS,OOO,ooO ~ired as a result of hazardous waste 
(.15A+B+2C+.01D) spills and accidents. 
Colorado' 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Illinois 
3/1/85 
10/1/82 
7/1/83 
1/1/85
 
*(F)-$2 per ton (R)-To reimburse the Department for ~X)-$10,ooo/yr 
~hose costs incurred in tracking, com­
~liance monitoring, plan review, draft 
~nd enforcement. (Annual Operating Fee) 
(R)-To reimburse for those costs to re­
~iew, draft and issue permits. (Permit 
~pplication Review Fee) 
*(G)-.04 per gallon (R)-Shall be deposited in the emergency
 
.05 per pound
 spill response fund established under
 
$8.00 per cubic yard section 22a-451.
 
(F)-3% on annual gross (R)-a) Cost of collecting the tax, b)
receipts (TAX ON inspection costs, c)security costs, d) 
HAZARDOUS WASTE hazardous waste contingency planning, e) 
FACILITIES) road construction, 1,000 ft. from 
facility. (TAX ON COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS 
IWASTE FACILITIES). 
(R)-Provide authority, and require 
counties and municipalities to adequate­
ly plan and provide efficient, environ­
~entally acceptable resource recovery 
and management, and require counties to 
plan for proper hazardous waste manage­
Iment. 
(F)-.Ol per gal. (treat­ (1) . J(X)-$lO,OOO
ment site;$2.02 per cu. (R)-aO% goes to National Pridrities Lis per yr.
 
yd. (offsite) ;.03 per
 (of those sites within the state of 
gal. (disposal site); Illinois) 
$6.06 per cubic yd. 
Indiana 10/1/85 (F) (R)-75% Hazardous Substance Emergency 
~esponse Trust Fund, 25' County 
M)-1985:$4.50 
kX)-1989:$S.50 
(+$1) 
Iowa 7/1/85 (G)-$10 per ton 
(F) 
(R)-Remedial Fund, Cleanup of Hazardous 
~onditions, Cleanup of Abandoned/Un­
pontrolled disposal sites 
Kansas 5/1/85 (*G)(F)-Storage, 
disposal 
(T)-$250 
treatment 
Kentucky 10/1/84 (G) (I)-New techniques in recycling waste 
~eduction 
KX)-(G)-Regi­
.tration fee 
Louisiana 7/1/85 (G) 
(F) 
(R)-Placed on Generators 
(R)-Maintenance 
- 500 
(X) 
. . 
Maine 
---I 
12/1/85 (R)-The Maine hazardous waste fund is 
~ stabliShed to be used by the department s a nonlapsing, revolving fund. he fund shall not exceed $600,000 
(G)-More than 1,000 
kilo. (S)-.12 a gal.
(0)-.15 a gal. disposal 
facility
(0)-.09 gal. treatment 
facility 
(D)-storage, more than J 
monthls less 6 months-.06 
a gal. 6 months-.OJ for 
each 6 month period 
I I I· 
Minnesota 7/1/83 (G)-*Tax
*Administrative Fee 
(R)-Investigation, monitoring, and 
~ esting; removal and remedial actions, ncluding enforcement and compliance fforts 
Mississippi 7/1/83 (F)-$5 per ton $2 per 55 gal. drum 
(R)-20t, perpetual care and maintenance 
lOt, general fund of the state of 
~ississippi. All other fUJildS.,., general 
~und of the municipality or ~ounty 
Missouri 
New 
Hampshire 
New York 
9/1/83 
8/16/83 
6/1/85 
(G)-$l.OO per ton 
Worker-$2.00 per 
person 
(G)-Quarterly fee of 
.04 kilo 
.18 per pound 
(F)-Out-of-State 
*(F)
*(G) 
(R)-Self containment and cleanup of 
sites where hazardous waste have been 
stored or disposed of which threaten 
the environment 
(R)-Create a state superfund 
(X)-Cannot
exceed $10,000 
per year 
(H)-Shall pay 
$50 lquarter
(X)-no aore 
than $6,000IPr quarter 
CK)-Must
exceed or 
equal $50.00 
(X)-End of any 
quarter aaount 
collected or 
exceed 
$10,000,000 no 
.ore tax 
Ohio 11/16/81 * (F) (R)-Reduce administrative costs (X)-Shall not exceed 
$10,000 
South 
Carolina 5/16/85 I	 (G)-$13 per ton, 
landfill or other 
(F)-out-of-State, $18 
per ton 
5/23/85Tennessee *(G)-Who ships waste 
offsite for storage, 
treatment or disposal
* (F)-storage,treatment, 
or disposal permit
(T)-Transporter permit
under the Act - $100 
(R)-To ensure the availability of funds 
for (contingencies arising from) re­
sponse actions necessary at peraitted 
hazardous waste landfills and necessary
from accidents in the transportation of 
hazardous aaterials and to de-fray the 
costs of governmental response actions 
at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites 
(R)-Shall be restricted to operation Ofl(x)-~all not 
the hazardous waste aanage.ent program exceed $10,000 
establishment pursuant to the Act 
*(F)-P1an review fees (R)
and License fees 
*(T)-Operating License 
Wisconsin 
r: 
TABLE A2: SURVEY OF STATE TAXES ON HAZARDOUS WASTE
 
STATE DIFFERENT TAX RATES 
(S)=ONSITE (L)=LAND (O)=OFFSITE P) 
PENALTIES 
NOT MAKING PAYMENT-(F)FAILURE TO PAY/FILE 
California Wastes excluded from regulation by the 
U.s. (RCRA)-first 3500 tons (25% of 
base)-$2.48. 
Wastes resulting from extraction 
-first 3500 tons (25% of base)­
$2.~8 
Extremely hazardous waste (200% of 
base)-$19.84. Restricted hazardous 
waste (200% of base)-$19.48. 
Residues reSUlting from incineration­
(%5 of base)-.50. Other not sUbject 
to the fees above-first 3500 per ton 
(100% of base)-$9.92 
Surface impoundment (10% of base)­
.99 (DISPOSAL FEE) 
WASTE 
CATEGORY 
RELATIVE RATE 
OF TAXATION-
TOTAL TONS 
REPORTED FOR 
TAX (due by 
JULY 1,1985) 
A 
B 
C 
o 
15%'of base rate 
100% of base rate 
200% of base rate 
1% of base rate 
1,096,555.3 
522,870.0 
33,621.6 
377,314.7 
$2.97 
19.78 
39.56 
0.20 
Colorado *(L)-Injection wells-$S,OOO 
Incineration-$l,OOO 
Tanks-$500 
Short-term storage-$lOO 
(OPERATING FEE) 
(L)-Commercial-$50,OOO 
underground injection 
wells-$50,OOO 
(P)-Late charge of 2' per month 
on portion not paid, within 30 days 
) 
I 
Colorado 
(cont 'd.) 
(L)-$25,OOO 
Underground injection 
wells-$25,000 
All-$5,000 
Except resource 
recovery-$3,000 
Resource Recovery-$l,OOO 
(PERMIT FEE) 
connecticut *.05 per gal.: Metal hydroxide, 
sludge from wastewater treat­
ment of electroplating. 
Metal finishing operations: 
.05 per pound 
.10 per cubic yard 
.06 on any other waste listed 
on manifest in gallons 
(F)-To pay, lot of a.aunt 
due or $50 charge, which ever 
is greater 
Florida Owner of Commercial hazardous 
waste recycling facility credit 
shall;5% of the cost of the 
stationary facility equipment 
placed in service during the 
taxable year and used for the 
recycling of hazardous waste 
. 
Illinois (L)-Underground-$2,000 per 
year, if not more than 
10,000,000 gallons 
$5,000 per year, if more 
than 10,000,000 gallons 
$9,000 ,per year, if more 
than 50,000,000 
(D)-Treatment, .01 per gallon 
$2.02 per cubic 
yard 
Iowa (D)-Transported-$10 per ton (F)-To pay the fees imposed 
(L)-$40 per ton shall be assessed a penalty 
Destructed/treatment-$2.00 of 15% of the fee due 
in addition t~ the fee due 
*storage-$l,SOO 
Treatment-$2,SOO 
Disposal other than 
landfill-$S,OOO
l (L) -$10,000 
Ii (G) -Less than 2 tons-$lOO 
Kansas 
i1 Greater than	 2 tons 
'11less than 10 tons-$200 J Greater than 10 tons 
~less than 100 tons-$500 
" Greater than 100 tons 
~less than 500 tons-$l,OOO 
U Greater than 500 tons 
I! less than 1,000 tons-$5,000\ (T) -$250 
Kentucky i Long-term containment ~With treatment-$l.OO liquid 
11 .01 solid 
II ChemiC?al~y treated­
,1 .50 ll.qul.d
I .005 solid 
iDestructive­
! .50 liquid 
f • 005 solid 
I\ (S)-Long-term containment 
without treatment­
$1.25 liquid 
Long-term containment with 
treatment-$.25 liquid 
.0025 solid
 
Chemical!y treated-

I .25 liquid
I .005 solid 
'Destructive-.25	 liquid 
.005 solid 
I 
I 
II 
11 
I 
:~ 
10% penalty 
(F)-For responsible reason 
5% penalty each 30 days 
which cannot exceed 25% 
(P)-Too late, portion 
not paid-at interest 
placed on unpaid portion 
Louisiana 
Maine 
*(5)-$18,300 
(0)-$48,800 commercial 
Per site: (0)-$30,500 commercial 
$ 6,100 
(S)-$ 3,050 
Per Facility: $ 1,830 
Fee based on volume: 
Less than 1,000 tons-$1,220 
Less than 10,000 tons-$2,440 
Less than 100,000 tons-$3.660 
Less than, 1,000,000 tons-$4,880 
Disposal facility-$lO,OOO 
Commercial treatment (F)-$7,OOO 
(S)-Treatment (F)-$4,OOO 
other facilities of hazardous 
waste, including treatment 
(F) other than (8) and com­
mercial treatment (F) $2,500 
waste oil storage (F) $2,500 
(FEES FOR REVIEWING APPLI­
CATIONS). Disposal (F)-$l,SOO 
Commercial treatment (F) and (S) 
treatment (F)-$I,OOO 
Other waste (F) for hazardous 
waste, including treatment 
(F) other than (5) and 
commercial treatment (F)­
$500 I 
Waste oil storage (F)-$SOO 
(S)-Of generation-.12 per gal. 
Recycled or'reclaimed-.06 per gal. 
(P)-Late 15 days of 
due date will be 
subject to a late 
charge of 10% per 
month. 
(F)-To make payment­
enforcement action­
Environmental Quality 
Act 
(P)-Late, in addition to 
any other liability or penalty 
imposed by law, and person 
liable for any fee, shall 
pay 3 times the appropriate 
fee if the fee has 
not been paid within 6 
months after fee becomes 
due. 
Minnesota *Long-term containment without 
treatment-$.J2/gal. liquid 
$J2/cu. yd. solid 
Long-term containment after 
treatment-$.16/gal. liquid 
$16/cu. yd solid 
(L)-Treatment-$32/cu. yd. solid 
(0)-$.08 gal. liquid 
(I)-$8/cu. yd. solid 
*Administrative Fees: 
Liquid waste-Il: 
55 gal/yr-unsewered-$40 
56-500 gal/yr-unsewered-$90 
over 500-unsewered-$l30 
All sewered waste-$lOa 
Solid Waste-10l: 
550 Ibs/yr-$40 
551-5,000 Ibs/yr-$90 
Multiple waste stream­
unsewered liquid-over
 
55 gal/yr.-$25

unsewered solid-over
 
550 lbs/yr-/$25

Large quantity generator fee­
unsewered liquid-(l,OOO gals)-$130 plus $16 
unsewered solid-(5,000 Ibs.)-$lJO plus $7 
Miscellaneous fee-unsewered solid 
or liquid $60 plus an addt'l. $40 
Mississippi Violation of any provision, 
upon conviction, be guilty 
of misdemeanor and shall be 
subject to a fine of not more 
than $25,000 for each day of 
violation or imprisonment 
not exceed one year 
Missouri (S)-(L)-2% tax, gross charges (p)-Fail, 15% of the tax 
and fees, $25 per ton 
(O)-Transported-$2 per ton 
New 
Hampshire (G) of hazardous waste located 
in this state who generates in 
a 3-month period 300 kilo. or 
more of unrecyclable hazardous 
waste shall pay 1/4, no more than 
.04 per kilo or disposing of such 
waste. The fee on such waste 
shall be no more than .07 per 
kilo .03 per pound. The (F)'s 
owner or operator shall make the 
appropriate quarterly fee payments 
Any generator shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor 
who AO Does not pay the fee 
required in RSA 147-B:B or 
$100 a day. 
New York (G)-(O)-(L)-$27 per ton 
(L)-(S)-$27 per ton 
Incineration (0)-$9 per ton 
Incineration (S)-$2 per ton 
Except (L) treatment-$16(0) 
(F)Out-of-State-(L)-$27 
Incineration-$9 
Other-$16 per ton 
(F)-25t of the assessment 
amount determined 
(P)-OVerdue, an interest 
charge of 15t annum will 
be assessed 
Ohio (0)-9% of each charge made for 
disposal charge. 
(S)-$2,OOO for each (F) up to 
5 acres and $400 for each additional 
acre. 
Deep well injection-$5,000 
Hazardous waste(F) installation and 
operation permits - payment of an 
annual fee not to exceed $1,500 
payable upon application 
(P)-Late shall pay an additional 
lot of the a.ount of the fee 
for each aonth that it is late 
south 
Carolina 
Shall be financed through 
the imposition of fees pro­
vided in Sections 44-56-170 
$4 per ton for wastes reported
under ,section 44-56(E)
$3 per ton for section 44-56 170 (A)
$1.50 per ton for wastes reported
under section 44-56-510(1) and 
$2 per ton for wastes reported under 
section 44-56-510(2) 
I 
, 
South 
Carolina 
(cont 'd.) 
Tennessee 
For all hazardous wastes generated 
outside of the state and received 
at a facility each owner/operator 
of hazardous waste (L), disposal 
(F) shall pay $18 per ton. 
(5)-$1,500 if only storage and/or 
treatment operations are used; 
$2,500 if disposal operations 
are included. 
(0)-$3,000 if only storage and/or 
treatment operations are used 
$5,000 if disposal opeations are 
included (PERMIT APPLICATION FEE) 
(T)-$25
Storage Operations(5): 
0-10,000 ga18-$2,500 
10,001-100,000 qa18-$3,500 
100,000-1,000,000 9a1-$4,OOO 
over 1,000,000 qa18-$4,500 
Treatment (8): 
0-10,000 gals per day $2,500 
10,001-100,000 gpd $3,500 
100,001-1,000,000 gpd $4,000 
over 1,000,000 gpd-$4,500 
(0): 0-10,000 gpd-$5,OOO ·
 
10,001-100,000 gpd-$7,OOO
 
100,001-1,000,000 gpd-$8,000
 
over 1,000,000 gpd-$9,OOO
 
Disposal'Operations (5)­
$5,000 plus landfill-$250 
(L)-$250 
Injection wells-$250 
(0)-$10,000 plus 
1andfill-$500 
(L)-$500
Injection wel1s-$500 ANNUAL 
PERMIT MAINTENANCE FEES 
PERMIT MAINTENANCE FEES (dollars) 
(G) - (0) - $100 (ANNUAL GENERATOR/SHIPPER MAINTENANCE FEE) 
... 
WISCONSIN 
OPERATION LICENSE I 
I (F)-TYPE FEASIBILITY 
REPORT AND PLAN SITE MONTHS 
PLAN OF OF CONSTRUCTION CLOSURE 
OPERATION OPERATION DOCUMENTATION PLAN 0-6 6-12 12-18 18-24* 
Storage 500 500 200 200 175 350 525' 700 
Small 500 - 200 200 175 350 525 700 
Storage 
Transportation 
- - - -
100 200 300 400 
Landfill 10,000 10,000 1,000 1,500 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
Surface 10,000 10,000 1,000 1,500 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
Impoundment 
. Incineration 1,400 - 300 200 450 900 1,350 1,800 
----
Treatment 1,400 1,400 300 200 450 900 1,350 1,800 
-­
. . .. 
Plan 500 500 
- 500 - - - -, 
Modification 
Other 1,400 1,400 300 
- - -
1,350 1,800 
* Plus 2 year renewals 
California ~ 
As of April- 1, 1985, the hazardous substance tax, (hazard~us 
superfund tax) went into effect. The purpose of this tax is to 
provide a fund for damages, payments, emergency response, and 
remedial action required as a result of hazardous waste spills and 
accidents. The following formula determines the tax rate: 
Basic tax rate: $15,000,000 
.15A+B+2C+.01D 
A=	 Total amount of hazardous or extremely hazardous wastes 
exempted from regulation by the u.s. Environmental 
Protection Agency (generally energy related wastes), 
hazardous or extremely hazardous disposed of into 
injection wells or land filling. 
B=	 Total amounts of hazardous wastes (as defined by 
California state Law). 
C= Total amount of extremely hazardous wastes. 
D= total amount of hazardous or extremely hazardous wastes 
generated by extraction, beneficiation, and processing 
of ores and minerals of ore (includes phosphate rock and 
overburden for mining of uranium ore). 
The tax rate for each type of waste is determined by 15%, 100%, 
200% and 1% for types A,B,C, and D respectively. The amount of 
waste dumped in 1984 and the rate calculated by this formula for 
each category follows: 
Waste Relative Rate Total Tons Tax (due 
Category of Taxation Reported by 7/1/85) 
A 15% of base rate 1,096,555.3 $ 2.97 
B 100% of base rate 522,870.0 19.78 
C 200% of base rate 33,621.6 39.56 
D 1% of base rate 377,314.7 .20 
In addition to the Hazardous Waste superfund tax, a waste disposal 
fee is also collecte~ 
Category 
Base Rate 
Description 
Relative 
Rate Fee Rate 
$9.92 
1 Wastes excluded from 
regulation by the 
U.S.EPA 
under the Federal 
Resources Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
which are not otherwise 
SUbject to the fee in 
category 3 or 4. 
Assessed 
on first 
3500 tons 
25% of 
base 
$2.48 
Category 
2 
- DeScription 
Wastes which result 
from the extraction 
beneficiation and 
processing of ores 
and minerals which 
is not otherwise 
sUbject to the fee in 
category 3 or 4. 
Cap
Assessed 
on first 
3500 tons 
per month 
Relative 
Rate 
25% of 
base 
$ 2.4~ 
Fee Rate 
3 Extremely hazardous 
waste. 
200% of 
base 
-
$19.84 
4 Restricted hazardous 
waste. 
200% of 
base $19.84 
5 Residues resulting
from incineration 
or other controlled 
treatment procedures.* 
5% of 
base 
6 Hazardous waste that 
is not otherwise 
sUbject to the fees 
in categories 1,2, 
3,4,5 or 7. 
Assessed 
on first 
3500 tons 
per month 
100% of 
base 
$ 9.92 
7 Wastes disposed of to 
surface inpoundments 
which meet the 
following criteria: 
a) the impoundment has a 
double liner. 
b) the impoundment has 
a leachate collection 
system. 
c) the impoundment has 
a minimum of one up­
gradient , and two down 
gradient groundwater 
monitoring well in place
and in operation. 
d) the impoundment has 
vadose zone monitoring 
system in place and in 
operation. 
a 
e) the impoundment has 
legally enforceable 12 
year closure-plan. 
a 
f) the impoundment operator 
_has provided Department

of Health Services and
 
state Water Resources
 
Control Board with
 
documentation of 'a'
 
through 'e' above.
 
* Must have determined from the Department of Health services that 
the process(es) alter the physical properties of the waste being 
incinerated or treated and effectively remove all free liquids and 
volatile organic constituents from the waste. 
Colorado 2 
As of Marcb r, 1984, The Hazardous waste Fee System was in eff~ct. 
The Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal facilities 
that are subject to the annual operating fees are as follows: 
Facitity Class Regulated unit Annual operating Fee 
Class I Landfills, under­ $5000 
ground injection
wells. 
Class II Surface impound­
ments, land treat­
$1000 
ment units incin­
eration. 
Class III Tanks, containers, $500 
waste piles, treat­
ment facilities. 
Class IV POTW's, UIC wells, $100 
short-term storage. 
All facilities that are operated for the treatment, storage, or 
disposal of hazardous waste, shall provide payment of annual 
operating fee to provide reimbursement to the Department for those 
costs incurred in tracking, compliance monitoring, plan review, 
enforcement, and other recurring activities that are reasonable 
and necessary to ensure compliance with these regulations. 
The Permit Application Review Fee is for all facilities that are 
operated for those costs incurred in reviewing permit applications 
and drafting and issuing a permit. 
Facility Class	 Regulated unit Ceiling Fee 
Class I	 Commercial landfill. $50,000 
Commercial under­
ground injection 
well. $50,000 
Non-commercial land­
fill. $25,000 
Non-commercial under­
ground injection well. $25,000 
Class II	 All $ 5,000 
Class III	 Exact Resource 
Recovery $ 3,000 
Class IV	 Resource Recovery $ 1,000 
If a minor modification is wanted, a flat rate shall be charged, 
$25 administration fee. 
Termination of a permit shall be sUbject to $25 administration fee 
plus $50 hourly charge for Departmental staff and time involved. 
All hazardous waste disposal facilities shall pay an amount equal 
to $2 per ton for hazardous waste disposed at the facility. 
Fees paid by a non-commercial hazardous waste treatment or storage 
facility shall not exceed $10,000. 
Hazardous waste disposal facilities shall submit payment of -the 
waste volume fee within 30 days after the end of each calendar 
quarter. A late payment charge of 2% per month or portion thereof 
will be assessed on the unpaid balance. 
connecticut 3 
According to the October 1,1982 Substitute House Bill, genera~ors 
of hazardous waste, shipping waste to treatment or disposal 
facilities located in the state, shall pay the following 
assessments: 
Payment 
1. .04 per gal • 
• 05 per pound. 
$8 per cubic yd. 
2. .05 per gal. of: 
a) Metal Hydroxide
 
b) Sludge from wastewater treatment of electroplating;or
 
c) Metal Finishing operations - .06 per gal.
 
d) Any other hazardous waste entered on a manifest in gals.
 
Whenever an assessment is not paid when due, a penalty of 10% of 
the amount due or $50 whichever is greater, is assessed. 
An employee of the Department of Environmental Protection Agency 
stated that "The bill did not generate the expected revenue, 
because the amount of waste was underestimated, therefore the fee 
was set way too low". He also adds that they have had few 
administrative problems, due to the demand of a quarterly report 
and a periodical checking. 
Florida 4 
As of July 1,- 1983 the following went into effect: 
The tax on commercial hazardous waste facility: a 3 percent tax is 
hereby levied on the annual gross receipts of a privately owned, 
permitted, commercial hazardous waste transfer, storage, 
treatment, or disposal facility , which tax is payable annually on 
or before July 1, by the owner of the facility to the primary host 
local government. 
The purpose of the tax is for: 
1. The cost of collecting the tax 
2. Local inspection costs 
3. Security costs 
4. Hazardous waste contingency planning 
5. Road construction 1,000 feet from facility 
A hazardous waste facility tax credit is a credit against the tax 
imposed, which shall allow the owner of any commercial hazardous 
waste facility who incurrs expenses for hydrologic, geologic, or 
soil site evaluations and permit fees required by the Department 
of Environmental Regulation which credit shall be equal to the 
amount of such expenses incurred. A credit against the tax 
imposed shall be allowed to the owner of any state permitted 
commercial hazardous waste recycling faciltity which credit shall 
be an amount equal to 5% of cost of the stationary facility 
equipment placed in service during the taxable year and used for 
the recycling of hazardous wastes. 
Any small quantity generator, who does not comply with the 
requirements of subsection (2), and has received two subsequent 
certified letters from the county, shall be SUbject to a fine of 
$25 and $100 per day for a maximum of 100 days. 
5Illinois
Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch 111.1/2 Sec. 22.2 states the following: 
For hazardous waste disposed in an underground injection well, the below 
payments should be made: 
1.	 $2,000 per year if not more than 10,000,000 gallons. 
2.	 $5,000 per year if more than 10,000,000 gallons but less than 
50,000,000 gallons. 
3.	 $9,000 per year if more than 50,000,000 gallons. 
As of January 1, 1984 ... 
Disposal 
o	 The fees for on-site disposal paid by site owner
 
$.03/gal or $6.06/cubic yard of hazardous material
 
not to exceed $10,000.
 
o	 The fees for off-site disposal paid by site owner
 
$.03/ga1 or $6.06/cubic yard of hazardous material.
 
o	 The fees for underground injection are as stated above. 
Treatment 
o	 The fees for off-site treatment paid by site owner $.Ol/gal 
or $2.02/cubic yard. 
In addition, as of January 1, 1985, the following fees are to be levied on the 
owner or operator: 
o $ 29,000 off-site 
o 6,000 on-site 
o 4,800 underground injection 
Indiana 6 
As of October 1, 1985 the following tax will be in effect: 
Tax per Ton 
1985 after sept. 30 $4.50 
1986 $5.50 
1987 $6.50 
1988 $7.50 
1989 $8.50 
The state of Indiana has a two-part tax system: 75% of the 
revenue from the tax goes to a Hazardous Substances Emergency 
Response Trust Fund and the remaining 25% goes to the county. 
The purposes of the county fund are to: 
1.	 Establish monitoring wells on land near the site of 
disposal facility. 
2.	 Analyzing samples from monitoring wells, established 
under subdivision one. 
3.	 Conducting other types of testing and surveillance for 
hazardous waste contamination of land near disposal 
site (facility). 
4.	 Providing training for county and local public health 
and public safety officers in the proper procedures for 
dealing with emergencies involving hazardous waste. 
5.	 Providing special clothing and equipment needed by 
county and local public health and pUblic safety 
officers for dealing with emergencies involving 
hazardous substances and/or waste. 
6.	 Funding research on alternatives to land disposal as a 
means of eliminating hazardous waste. 
7.	 Paying the cost of hazardous substances and/or waste 
removal and remedial action at a site located within the 
county. 
The purposes of the Trust Fund are to: 
1.	 Finance contracts on cooperative agreements between the 
state and the President of the united states, pursuant 
of CERCLA, which contracts or agreements are a 
prerequisite to the President providing remedial action 
in this state, in the event of a release of hazardous 
substances. Such contracts or agreements must provide 
assurance deemed adequate by the President that: 
a) a state assure all fut~re maintenance, 
b) the state will payor assure payment of: 
1)	 ten percent (10%) of the cost of the 
remedial action including all future 
maintenance. 
2)	 fifty percent (50%) or such greater amount 
as the President may determine appropriate 
of any sums expended in the response to a 
release at a facility that was owned at 
the time of any disposal of hazard~us 
waste therein by the state or a political 
subdivision of the state. 
2.	 Private state assistance in the form of supplies, 
material, services and equipment to: 
a)	 prevent discharge of hazardous substances already 
discharged into or on the air, land or waters of 
this state. 
3.	 Pay the cost of hazardous substances removal and 
remedial action at a site that is contaminated with 
hazardous substances, but that is not eligible for 
removal or remedial action through a control or 
cooperative agreement under subdivision (1). 
According to Indiana's Solid Waste Facility site Approval 
Authority, when the tax went into effect in 1982, it did not 
generate the expected revenue. However, the new proposal, 
effective in October of this year, should generate the expected 
revenue. 
Iowa 7 
As of JU~y 1, 1985, the purpose of the tax is to create' a 
Hazardous Waste Remedial Fund and to provide for the cleanup of 
hazardous conditions and the management and cleanup of abandoned 
or uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal sites. Money collected 
or received by the Department shall be transmitted to the 
treasurer of the state for deposit in the hazardous waste remedial 
fund. 
The fees imposed on the generator are as follows: 
$10 for off-site 
$40 land 
$2 treatment, destroyed 
Failu~e to pay the fee imposed shall be assessed a penalty of 
of the fee due in addition to the fee due. The system is 
15% 
not 
expected to generate a great deal of revenue. 
Kansas 8 
Kansas S~atutes Annotated Hazardous Waste Management Article 34, 
states, Each hazardous waste storage facility shall pay an annual 
monitoring fee of $1500. Each treatment facility shall pay an 
annual monitoring fee of $2500. Disposal other than landfill 
shall pay $5000. Landfill shall pay $10,000, Transportation $250, 
kilograms and less than 1,000 kilograms. 
Generator shall pay: 
Less than 2 tons $ 100 
Greater than 2 tons less than 10 tons $ 200 
Greater than 10 tons less than 100 tons $ 500 ­
Greater than 100 tons less than 500 tons $1,OOQ 
Greater than 500 tons less than 1000 tons $3,000 
Greater than 1000 tons $5,000 
The disposal facility - monthly perpetual care trust fee: 
.25 per cubic foot 
.25 per cUbic foot 
.05 per cubic foot 
disposed in landfills 
deep well injection
other methods 
A generator is defined as any person who generates more than 75 
Kentucky 9 
The October I, 1985 Hazardous waste Management Assessment, states 
the following: 
The purpose of the Hazardous Waste fee is to promote the 
development of statewide programs under the responsibility of a 
single agency. The intent of the general assembly is to add to 
and coordinate, and not replace, existing efforts and 
responsibilities in the areas of hazardous waste management on 
private industry and future to finance assistance and coordination 
by imposing assessments on the generators of hazardous waste. - ~ 
The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet is 
given the authority to administer the provisions and programs. 
Generators of off-site treatment and disposal and on-site 
treatment and disposal shall be one-half of the amount as would be 
assessed for off-site treatment and dispopsal facilities that 
incinerate, detoxify, solidify, neutralize or recycle hazardous 
waste shall be exempt unless the process involves the land filling 
of hazardous waste. 
a)	 Long-term containment without treatment shall increase by 
$.01 annually up to $.05 per gal. 1983 if liquid -- $2.50 
per cubic yd. if the waste is solid. 
b)	 Long-term containment with treatment $.01 per gal. if 
waste is liquid or $1 per cubic yd. if the waste is 
solid. 
c)	 Destructive treatment by incineration or other means $.05 
per gal. if liquid, $.50 if waste is solid. 
Failure to file, Cabinet will make an estimate plus a 10% penalty. 
Failure to file for a responsible reason, 5% penalty each 30 days, 
cannot exceed 25%. If a portion of the tax is not paid, 8% 
interest is placed on unpaid portion. 
If the fund exceeds $6,000,000 the assessment shall not be 
collected until the fund is less that $3,000,000. 
Waste	 Tax Rate 
Off-site: 
Long-term containment without Treatment $2.50 liquid 
Long-term containment with Treatment $1.00 liquid 
$ .01 solid 
Chemically Treated $ .50 liquid 
$ .005 solid 
Destructive Treatment $ .50 liquid 
$ .005 solid 
On-site 
Long-term containment without Treatment $1.25 solid 
Long-term -containment with Treatment $ .50 
$ .005 
liquid 
solid 
Chemically Treated $ .25 liquid 
$ .0025 solid 
Destructive Treatment $ .25 liquid 
$ .0025 solid 
According to a staff member, the legislation expected the system 
to generate $3 to $5 million. In the past three years the sys~em 
has generated the following revenues: 
1980 - $126,000 
1982 - $ 80,000 
1983 - $ 87,000 
There is a minor administrative problem as well. e.g.,the 
accountants have problems in knowing the difference between sludge 
and hazardous waste. The staff member states that he has to take 
the generators word that what they have is sludge and not 
hazardous waste. However, the staff person explains that they 
can control this to some extent by making the generators file with 
the Department of Energy and Natural Resources. 
--
.. 10Lou1s1ana 
As of July 1, 1985, generators, treaters, storers and disposer~ of 
hazardous waste shall pay a tax to establish a fee system for 
funding the monitoring, investigation and other activities 
required to be conducted for the maintenance of a state and 
healthful environment by the Department of Environmental Quality 
Act. Fees are required for all permits, licenses, registrations 
and variances authorized by the Act. 
The fee schedule will be as follows: 
site analysis -- per acre site size $ 250 
Process and plan -- analysis $1,000 
Facility analysis -- per facility $ 500 
Management and/or financial analysis $1,000 
Operators who paid an application fee of $15,000 will be assessed 
an additional fee equalling the deficit, apportioned equally, 
provided that no operator pays more than the calculated fee. 
The Annual Maintenance Fees for treaters, storers and disposers 
are: 
Apportion fees: 
Fee per site + fee per facility + fee based on volume. 
Fee per site: 
Off-site disposers (commercial) $30,500 
Off-site disposers (non-commercial) $ 6,100 
On-site disposers $ 3,050 
Fee per facility: 
standard for all disposers $ 1,830 
(for each facility) 
Fee based on volume: 
Less than 1,000 tons $ 1,220 
Less than 10,000 tons $ 2,440 
Less than 100,000 tons $ 3,660 
Less than 1,000,000 tons $ 4,880 
More than 1,000,000 tons $ 6,100 
Maximum fee (cut-off): 
Off-site (commercial) $48,800 
Off-site (non-commercial) $24,400 
On-site $18,300 
The higher fee for off-site is due to cost of the manifest system 
and emergency response to transport spills. All generators of 
not received within 15 days of due date will be sUbject to a large 
hazardous ~ waste must file or have on file a notification of the 
facility. 
The annual monitoring and maintenance fee will be $183. Payment 
charge, 10% per month. Failure to pay shall sUbject the person to 
applicable enforcement action under the Louisiana Environmental 
Quality Act including but not limited to revocation or suspension
of the applicable permit, license, registration or variance. 
Maine 11 
As	 of December 1, 1984 the following fees have been in effect: ­
Fees for Reviewing Applications: 
1. Disposal facility	 $10,000 
2.	 Commercial treatment facility $ 7,000 
3.	 On-site treatment facility $ 4,000 
4.	 Other waste facility for hazardous 
waste, including treatment facilities 
other than on-site and commercial 
treatment facilities $ 2,500 
5.	 waste oil storage facility $ 2,500 
Annual Fees: 
1.	 Disposal facility $ 1,500 
2.	 Commercial treatment facility 
and on-site treatment facility $ 1,000 
3.	 Other waste facilities for 
hazardous waste, including 
treatment facilities other than 
on-site and commercial treatment 
facilities $ 500 
4.	 waste oil storage facility $ 500 
If more than 1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste are generated in 
any calendar month, the generator shall pay a fee as follows: 
1.	 Hazardous waste which is disposed of on the site of 
generation in a licensed hazardous waste disposal 
facility, $.12 a gal. and 
2.	 Hazardous waste which is stored on the site of generation 
in a licensed hazardous waste storage facility for more 
than 90 days, but less than 6 calendar months, and for 
each time period thereafter or 6 calendar months or 
portion thereof, $.03 a gal. 
Fees for action taken off-site of generation: 
Any person in the state who generates more than 1,000 kilograms of 
hazardous waste in any calendar month shall pay: 
1.	 Hazardous waste which is transported off-site to a 
licensed hazardous waste treatment facility for 
treatment, $.09 a gal. 
2.	 For hazardous waste which is transported off-site to a 
licensed hazardous waste storage facility for more than 3 
months, but less than 6 months, $.06 a gal. After 
storage at the facility for 6 months, the owner or 
operator of that hazardous waste facility shall pay $.03 
a q~l. for the hazardous waste stored at that facility 
for each 6 month period. 
3.	 For hazardous waste which is transported off-site to be 
beneficially used or reused or legitimately recycled or 
reclaimed, $.06 a gal. 
If payment of the fee is late, there is a penalty. In addition to 
any other liability or penalty inposed by law, any person liable 
for any fee imposed shall pay 3 times the appropriate fee if ~he 
fee has not been paid to the Main Hazardous waste Fund within -6 
months after the fee becomes due. No person may be required ~to 
pay, for any calendar year, more than $15,000. 
Minnesota 12 
Minnesota ~roJected that its tax would generate $900,000 annually. 
The tax took effect July 1, 1983 and collected $460,690 for the 
six month period from July to December 1983. This put the state 
at 102% of its estimated revenues (expected revenues for the six 
month period would be $450,000). 
Minnesota charges a hazardous waste generato
waste generator fee. The generator tax 
generator of hazardous waste. 
r tax and 
is imposed 
a haza
on 
rdous 
each 
--
Minnesota Anual	 Hazardous waste Generator Tax 
Rate Schedule 
Destination	 Tax Rate 
Long-term containment without treatment $0.32/gal. liquid 
$32/cu.yd. solid 
Long-term containment after treatment $0.16/gal. liquid 
$16/cu.yd. solid 
Land treatment $32/cu.yd. 
Other treatment to render non-hazardous; 
incineration $0.08/gal. liquid 
$8/eu.yd. solid 
The administrative fees are as follows: 
Basic Fee: 
Liquid waste Solid Waste 
Amount Generated Unsecured Secured 
11-55 gal/yr. $30 $ 75 101-550 lbs/yr $30 
56-500 gal/yr. $60 $ 75 551-5,000 lbs/yr $60 
over 500 gal/yr. $90 $745 over 5,000 lbs/yr $90 
Multiple waste stream Fee: 
Waste Type and Amount 
Unsecured liquid waste over 55 gal./yr.	 $20 for eaeh 
additional 
waste stream 
Unsecured solid	 waste over 550 lbs./yr. over one 
Large Quantity Generator Fee: 
Waste Type and Amount 
Unsecured liquid waste over 1,000 gal./yr.	 $12 for each 
additional 
1,000 gal. 
Unsecured solid waste over 5,000lbs./yr. 
Miscellaneous Fees: 
Type of Fee Type of Waste 
Initial Fee Unsecured liquid 
or solid 
Secured liquid 
New Waste Fee 
$5 for each 
additional 5,000 
lbs. or fraction 
thereof 
$60 plus $40 
for each 
additional 
-­
waste stream 
over one 
$30 
$40 for each 
new waste 
stream 
Mississippi 13 
As of July 1, 1983 the following laws governing solid and 
hazardous waste disposal have been in effect. 
commercial hazardous waste facilities must file quarterly reports 
and pay disposal fee; amount disposition of proceeds. 
An owner or operator of every commercial hazardous waste facility 
shall on a quarterly basis file, $5 per ton or $2 per (55) gal. 
drum. 
The	 purpose of fund is as follows: 
1.	 20% shall be remitted to the Department of Natural 
Resources to be held for the perpetual care and 
maintenance account of the respective facility. 
2.	 10% shall be remitted to the general fund of the state of 
Mississippi. 
3.	 All other funds shall be paid to the general fund of the 
municipality or county within which the facility is 
located. 
Any person who knowingly violates any order issued by the 
commission under the authority of this chapter shall, upon 
conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sUbject to a 
fine of not more that $25,000 for each day of violation or to 
imprisonment not to exceed one year. 
According to David Lee from the Department of Natural Resources 
Bureau of Pollution Control, there is a new bill not in effect yet 
which will generate the expected revenu~. 
Missouri 14 
The tax is to paid by waste generators and given to the Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR). 
The $2.00 per Worker Tax 
Employers registered as hazardous waste generators shall pay a 
quarterly tax of two dollars per covered worker. Each payment 
shall be due on the last working day of the quarter, unless the 
total annual payment is less than one thousand dollars, in which 
case payment shall be made annually. Annual payments shall be due 
before the end of the fourth quarter of each calendar year. If 
the generator fails to make payment, there will be a penalty of 
15% of the tax. 
The tax does not apply to state agencies, hospitals, universities 
and local government nor does it refer to other states that send 
hazardous waste to Missouri or small generators of hazardous 
waste. 
If less than 220 lbs. are generated during a months time, 
generator does not have to comply with regulations or pay fees. 
But if generator ever accumulates more than 220 lbs., DNR must be 
notified. 
The fee does not apply to mining waste like lead slag. If 
something that is hazardous is mixed with something that is not 
hazardous, the fee must usually be paid. Not applying to 
companies whose only hazardous waste is used oil. 
Generators pay $1 per metric ton and the payment per year will not 
exceed $10,000. 
The disposal landfill is 2% of the gross charages and fees, $25 
per ton for land. 
If the waste is transported off-site -- $2 per ton. 
New Hampshire 15 
As of August 16, 1983, the hazardous waste cleanup fund fees ~re: 
Every generator of hazardous waste located in this state who 
generates in a 3 month period 300 kilograms (661.5 pounds) or more 
of un-recycled hazardous waste shall pay quarterly hazardous waste 
generator fee to the office. Every generator described in this 
paragraph shall pay a minimum fee of $50 per quarter. No 
generator shall make the appropriate quarterly fee payments to the 
office. 
When the funds balance exceeds $3,000,000 the fees shall -be 
discontinued; the fees shall be reestablished when the funds 
balance is less than $2,400,000. 
Any	 generator shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who: 
1.	 Does not pay the fee required in RSA 147-B8. 
2.	 Knowingly gives or causes to be given any false 
information in part or documents required by the officer 
under RSA 147-B. 
Each day of violation of RSA 147-B:ll, I, shall constitute a 
separate offense. Notwithstanding RSA 651:2, each violation of 
RSA 147-B:ll, I, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $100 a 
day. 
New York 16 
As of June 1,~985, waste generators shall pay the following: 
$27 per ton for hazardous waste landfill on the site of 
generation. 
$27 per ton for hazardous waste landfill off the site of 
generation. 
$9 per ton for hazardous waste incineration (including energy 
recovery off the site of generation). 
~ $2 per ton for hazardous waste incineration (inclUding energy 
recovery on the site of generation). 
$16 per ton for hazardous waste treated or disposed of, 
except by landfilling or incineration, off the site of 
generation. 
Treatment, storage or disposal facility for out-of-state shall 
pay: 
$27 per ton for hazardous waste landfill. 
$9 per ton for hazardous waste incineration (inclUding energy 
recovery) 
$16 per ton for hazardous waste treated or disposed of, 
except by landfilling or incineration. 
The minimum quarterly payment, if less than $50 for a quarter, may 
be deferred to the payment due date for the following quarter and 
included with that payment. If the total due for both quarters 
remains less than $50, then payment may be deferred again until 
the amount due equals or exceeds $50. 
Failure to file shall result in a penalty of 25% of the assessment 
amount determined. An interest charge of 15% annum will be 
assessed on all overdue payments. 
In the event the comptroller shall certify that the total amount 
collected, at the end of any quarter, equals or exceeds 
$10,000,000, no tax shall be collected. 
Ohio 17 
The new fe~ schedule, effective November 16, 
continuing effort to reduce administrative co
1981, 
sts. 
will make a 
A person 
disposal 
issued 
facility 
a permit by the director 
pursuant to Chapter 3734 
for a 
of the 
solid 
Revised 
waste 
Code 
shall pay a fee of $500. A person issued a modification of any 
such permit shall pay a fee of $500. 
The annual fee for a solid waste facility operations license shall 
be $1,300 and shall be paid at the time application is made for~-a 
license. The fee includes the cost of licensing, all inspecti~ns, 
and other costs associated with the administration of the solid 
waste program. 
Fees will be as follows on disposal of hazardous waste to be 
collected according to the following schedule at all disposal 
facilities to which the hazardous waste facility installation and 
operation permit pursuant to section 3734.05 of the Revised Code: 
1.	 For facilities located off the premises where hazardous 
waste is generated, a fee of 9% of each charge that the 
facility owner or operator makes for disposal charge. 
The owner or operator of the facility, as a trustee for 
the state, shall collect the fee and forward it to the 
director. 
2.	 For facilities located on the premises where hazardous 
waste is generated, an annual fee of $2,000 for each 
disposal facility up to 5 acres in size and $400 for each 
additional acre, or $5,000 for each deep well at a 
disposal facility, or a combination of these amounts. 
The total annual fee for each disposal facility shall not 
exceed $10,000. The owner or operator shall pay the fee 
to the director each year upon the anniversary of the 
date of issuance of his installation and operation 
permit. If his payment is late, the owner or operator 
shall pay an additional 10% of the amount of the fee for 
each month that it is late. 
3.	 Hazardous waste facility installation and operation 
permits will be used SUbject to approval by the Hazardous 
Waste Facility Approval Board in accordance with section 
3734.05 of the Revised Code and to payment of an annual 
fee not to exceed $1,500 payable upon application and 
upon the anniversaries of the date of issuance during the 
term of the permit. 
South Carolina 18 
Beginning - on July 1, 1985, permitted hazardous waste disposal 
sites are restricted to a rate of land disposal by burial not to 
exceed 135,000 tons of hazardous waste for each twelve month 
period thereafter within the permitted area of the site. 
Provided, however, that the Commissioner may allow burial of waste 
in excess of that year's limitation upon certification that 
disposal, by land burial from a particular site, is necessary to 
protect the health and safety of the people of this state. 
The purpose of the hazardous waste contingency fund is to ensure 
the availability of funds for (contingencies arising from) 
response actions necessary at permitted hazardous waste landf~lls 
and necessary from accidents in the transportation of hazardous 
materials and to defray the costs of governmental response actions 
at uncontrolled hazardous waste site. The contingency fund shall 
be financed through the imposition of fees provided in sections 
44-56-170. $4 per ton for wastes reported under section 
44-56-170(E), $3 per ton for section 44-56-170(A), $1.50 per ton 
for wastes reported under section 44-56-510 and $2 per ton for 
wastes reported under section 44-56-510(2). 
There is hereby imposed a fee of $13 per ton of 
generated and disposed of in this state by land
means of land disposal. 
hazard
filling 
ous 
or 
waste 
other 
For all hazardous waste generated outside of the state and 
received at a facility, each owner/operator of a hazardous waste 
land disposal facility shall pay no less than $18 per ton. 
When the fund reaches $7.5 million, a report shall be provided 
outlining the accomplishments of cleanup activities. 
Tennessee 19 
The fee system for transporters, storers, treaters, disposers~nd 
certain generators of hazardous wastes is to establish a system 
and schedule whereby certain fees shall be levied and collected by 
the Commissioner. Expenditures of such fees collected shall be 
restricted to operation of the hazardous waste management program 
established pursuant to the Act. 
The	 fee applies to the following: 
1.	 All transporters having a transporter permit issued under 
the Act and all new or existing transporters SUbject - to 
the transporter permit requirements. 
2.	 Owners and operators of all hazardous waste storage, 
treatment and disposal facilities who have a storage, 
treatment or disposal permit issued under the Act or who 
are subject to the facility permit requirements of Rule 
1200-1-11-.07 and 
3.	 All generators who ship their hazardous wastes off-site 
for storage, treatment or disposal. 
The following permit application fees shall be paid by storage, 
treatment and disposal facilities: 
1.	 For facilities which will receive only hazardous wastes 
which are generated on-site: 
a)	 $1,500 if only storage and/or treatment 
operations are used. 
b)	 $2,500 if disposal operatons are included. 
2.	 For facilities which will receive hazardous waste from 
off-site generators: 
a)	 $3,000 if only storage and/or treatment 
operations are used. 
b)	 $5,000 if disposal operations are included. 
3.	 Transporters shall pay $100. 
The	 annual permit maintenance fees are: 
1.	 Transporters pay $25 
2.	 storage operations 
a)	 for facilities which are generated on-site: 
Design Capacity 
0-10,000 gals. $2,500 
10,001-100,000 gals. $3,500 
100,001-1,000,000 gals. $4,000 
Over 1,000,000 gals. $4,500 
b)	 for facilities which receive hazardous waste from 
off-site generators: 
Design Capacity 
0-10,000 gals. $5,000 
10,001-100,000 gals. $7,000 
100,0000-1,000,000 gals. $8,000 
Over1,000,000 gals. $9,000 
3.	 The owner or operator of each facility shall be assessed 
an annual fee based on the design capacity in gals. per 
day (GPO): 
a)	 for facillities which receive only hazardous 
wastes which are generated on-site: 
Design Capacity 
0-10,000 GPD $2,500 
10,001-100,000 GPD $3,500 
100,001-1,000,000 GPD $4,000 
Over 1,000,000 GPD $4,500 
b)	 for facilities which receive hazardous waste from 
off-site generators: 
Design Capacity 
0-10,000 GPD $5,000 
10,001-100,000 GPO $7,000 
100,001-1,000,000 GPD $8,000 
Over 1,000,000 GPD $9,000 
4.	 The owner or operator of each facility shall be assessed 
an annual fee based on the design capacity of the 
facilities disposal operations as set forth below: 
a)	 for facilities which receive only hazardous 
wastes which are generated on-site a base fee of 
$5,000 plus: 
1) $250 per each acre-foot of remaining 
design capacity of landfill operations (to 
include waste piles and surface 
impoundments used for disposal and sUbject 
to closure as landfills. 
2)	 $250 per each acre of remaining design 
capacity of land application operations, 
and 
3)	 $250 per each million gals. of remaining 
design capacity of injection wells. 
b)	 for facilities which receive hazardous waste fro~ 
off-site generators, a base fee of $10,000 plus: 
1) $500 per each acre-foot of remaining 
design capacity of landfill operations (to 
include waste piles and surface 
impoundments used for disposal and subject 
to closure as landfills. 
2) $500 per 
capacity 
and 
each acre of remaining design 
of land application operations, 
3) $500 
design 
per each million 
capacity of 
gals. of remaining 
injection well 
operations. 
5.	 Finally, the annual generator/shipper maintenance fee: 
a)	 each generator who ships hazardous waste off-site 
for storage, treatment or disposal must submit by 
10 days after the effective date of this rule, 
and along with the annual report required by Rule 
1200-1-11-03(5) (b) for each year thereafter, an 
annual maintenance fee of $100 
The maximum amount of the maintenance fees collected annually from 
any hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility shall 
not exceed $10,000. 
* 
(2)	 The department shall waive the plan review fees and license 
fees for a recycling facility which is exempt under s. NR 
181.19. 
(3)	 A plan modification, as referred to in Table XII, is a 
submittal which proposes to modify a feasibility report, plan 
of operation, interim license, variance or closure plan 
previously approved by the department. 
(4)	 certain small storage facilities may not be required to 
submit a feasibility and plan of operation report in 
accordance with s. NR 181.435(2). Applicants who submit a 
feasibility and plan of operation report at the same time for 
treatment and storage facilities, but not for landfills, 
surface impoundments and waste piles, shall only pay the 
feasibility report plan review fee. 
(5)	 Applicants sUbmitting a closure plan with a plan of operation 
or a feasibility and plan of operation report may not be 
required to pay the closure plan review fee. 
All facilities are required to pay a license and plan review fee, 
except for plan modification, which is not required to pay a 
license fee, and for transportation which is not required to pay a 
plan review fee, as indicated on the table. 
WISCONSIN 
According to Wisconsin's hazardous waste fee schedule, 
the ~o11owing payments shall be made: 
Table XII 
PERMIT MAINTENANCE FEES (dollars) 
OPERATION LICENSE 
M 0 NTH S 
FACILITY SITE CLOSURE (5)* 
TYPE REPORTS (4)* OPERATION CONSTRUCTION PLAN 0-6 6-12 12-18 18-24** 
storage 500 500 200 200 175 350 525 700 
Small 500 - 200 200 175 350 525 700 
Storage 
Transportation - - - - 100 200 300 400 
Landfill 10,000 10,000 1,000 1,500 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
Surface 1~,000 10,000 1,000 1,500 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
Impoundment 
Incineration(2) 1,4;00 
- 300 200 450 900 1,350 1,800 
Treatment (2) * 1,400 1,400 300 200 450 900 1,350 1,800 
Plan' 500 500 
- 500 
Modification(3) * 
I 
Othe:r 1,400 1,400 300 
-
450 900 1,350 1,800 
** 
Plus 2 year renewals 
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16.	 New York, state Department of Environmental conservation, 
June 1, 1985 (Charlie Goddard). 
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19.	 Tennessee, Rule 1200-1-11-08, Fee System for Transportation, 
Storers, Treaters, Disposers and certain Generators of 
Hazardous wastes, May 23, 1985 (Dwight Hinch). 
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